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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thes·is ·is to discuss the foreign 
policy inter-action between Britain and Germany from January , 
1933  "to June, 1936 , and to analyse British action, reaction 
and aims in foreign policy during that time . 
In  Chapter I, I deal with "three broad ideas by way 
of introduction . First, there is an analysis of those groups 
which are acting and reacting in the sphere of foreign policy . 
There are four groups enumerated : the governmental or official 
group; the parliamentary group; the press; and, finally, public 
opinion. The make-up of these groups , the sources for dis­
covering their react�ons , and the problems with identifying 
their reactions is also discussed. Furthermore, it includes 
a summary of the attitudes of the press toward Germany in the 
1930 1.s and some of the personalities involved . Secondly ,  
there is a discussion of the type of events to which these 
groups were reacting. There are three categories of events 
which are discussed : firs t ,  those moves which fall obviously 
into the category of foreign policy , like Germany ' s  withdrawal 
from the League of Nations in 1 9 3 3 ,  or the reoccupation of 
the Rhineland in 1936 ; secondly , there are those decisions , 
like the reintroduction of conscription in GerIJ1any , which can 
be construed as domestic or foreign policy; thirdly , there 
are those events which, altho�gh exclusively domestic , elicited 
2S5647 
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a response in Britain� Finally, there is a short bibliogra­
phical review, in which the types of sources that were availa­
bel to me and the problems with handling those sources is 
discussed_ 
The following four chapters deal with the actual events, 
from January, 1933  to June, 19 36 , which forms the bulk of 
the paper. Chapter I I  contains a background to the period 
under review in the form of a summary of British attitudes 
from 1919  to 1932 ,. and continues with a description of Anglo­
German relations in 19 3 3 .  Chapters I I I ,  rv, and V deal with 
th.e events and reactions in 1934 , 1935  and 1936  respectively. 
The £inal chapter contains the conclusion, in which 
I trace the permanent aims and interests of British foreign 
policy and how these can be reconciled to British reactions 
to German foreign pol�cy moves during the period under review. 
I. 
There is a plethora of historical literature 
concerning European diplomacy during the inter-war period. 
Much of the material, however, �oncerns the years 1938 and 
1939, and until recently the four or five years prior to 
that were not usually considered by students of appease-
ment except as a necessary background. Over the past ten 
years there has been an increasing interest in the 1920's 
and 30's as a whole in search of what one author calls 
h t - 1 T e Roo s or Appeasement. There is little argument ru�ongst 
scholars that the roots of what is called the British policy 
of appeasement are deep in the immediate post-war period. 
British reactions to German foreign policy moves in the late 
1930's are anticipated by previous developments in the 1920's 
and early 30's, but the rise and accession to power of Hitler 
in 1933 fundamentally changed the framework in which foreign 
policy in Europe was being made. Although it can be argued 
that Britain did not really come to terms with this change 
until late in 1938, there is now strong evidence of an aware-
ness of that change several years earlier. This study deals 
with the five years prior to 1938. Although there is more 
than a certain prescience of the dangers of Hitler's Germany 
exhibited in Britain, tne following analysis in no way at-
tempts to exonerate or condemn British appeasement of Germany, 
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but is an attempt to explain the reasons for British actions 
and reactions to German Foreign policy under Hitler. 
Before any attempt can be made to analyse British 
foreign policy attitudes toward Germany it is necessary to 
provide some kind of framework for that analysis. The two 
most important theoretical questions to be considered are, 
first, who was acting and reacting in the realm of foreign 
policy; and secondly, upon which issues were they reacting. 
When considering the problem of who was involved in 
the foreign policy process, there are four broad groups to 
be considered. First, and most important, is governmental, 
or official reaction. This includes the statements of both 
ministers and permanent civil servants or diplomats, as ex­
pressed in diplomatic documents, parliamentary statements and 
memoirs. Secondly, there are parliamentary reactions as ex­
pressed in parliamentary debate, public speeches and memoirs. 
Thirdly, there are press reactions, which are easily found 
in contemporary newspaper reports. Fourthly, there is the 
reaction of the general public, or the man in the street. 
The reaction of this last group is difficult to pinpoint since 
this is a period when public opinion polls were not widely 
used in Britain. For this reason, it is necessary to rely 
upon impressions, for the most part expressed in the other 
sources. These groups, it should be noted, are not mutually 
exclusive. That is to say that there is a gre�t deal of inter­
action, particularly between the first three groups. The 
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"quality press", for example, not only reacted to foreign 
policy but helped to form it.2 
Having listed these broad categories it is neces-
sary to expand on their make-up and relative importance. 
In Britain the most important reaction in the foreign 
policy process comes from the "official" group. Britain 
is what D. c. Watt calls an "oligocratic society"--that is 
3 to say a society in which power is exercised by a few. 
These "few", to be enumerated later:, are "less responsible 
to and responsive to the main movements and currents of 
mass public opinion than their counterparts in other coun-
tries, and studies of such movements and currents do not ne-
cessarily have any bearing on the currents and movements of 
• • h • k I 4 opinion among t eir ran s '· . It should be noted, however, 
that there are exceptions to this general rule and the two 
most notable examples occur in the period under consideration. 
The first occasion in this period upon which public opinion 
affected foreign policy was in 1933. The East Fulham by-
election of that year was won for the Labour Party, largely 
on a platform of disarmament. Thus when the Prime Minister, 
Stanley Baldwin, was urged by the Permanent Under Secretary 
at the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart, to press for 
speedy rearmament, "he [Baldwin] told him that he could not 
afford the risks. The British public, he knew, would have - J 5 to be educated to accept that it L rearmament. was necessary. " 
Public opinion, then, as expressed so emphatically in the 
polling booths of East Fulham, had a clear influence on British 
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rearmament policy in 1933. The next incident was the resig­
nation of Sir Samuel Hoare in 1935. Hoare was Foreign Secre­
tary at the time, and in an effort to solve the Abyssinian 
crisis suggested, in cooperation with his French counterpart, 
Pierre Laval, the partition of Abyssinia. When the Hoare­
Laval plan was made public the adverse reaction forced Hoare's 
resignation.
6 
These two incidents, however, are exceptions, 
and it would nevertheless be true to say that the direction 
of British foreign policy during the period 1933-37  was 
fashioned by an elite group. 
The character of this elite group is two-fold. On 
the one hand there are those woo made foreign policy, which 
can be divided into four categories: the political, the 
diplomatic, the bureaucratic and the military. This can be 
termed the "official" group. On the other hand there are 
those who sought to influence the making of foreign policy, 
that is to say, foreign policy discussion groups both inside 
and outside Parliament; the "quality press"; and finally the 
Crown and its advisors. As has already been noted there is 
interaction between the two sides of the elite. The. press 
corps, for' example, not only reported and interpreted foreign 
news and information which ministers used frequently, but also 
contributed to the general debate on foreign policy expecially 
as the originators of proposals and ideas.7 A special note 
should be taken here also of the position of the Crown. Whilst 
it is almost impossible to assess with any certainty the posi­
tion and influence of the Crown, it is equally certain that the 
5 
monarch is  not without views on issues and that he makes 
them known to his government and ·others . The monarch is  
aware of  his  government ' s  action through daily dispatches 
and weekly audiences with his Prime Minister at which 
opinions are exchanged. "The most plausible hypothesis 
is that which imputes the most influence to the Crown on 
issues on which the Cabinet is uncertain ,  divided or 
willing to be pushed. It is known , for example,  that 
King George V was thoroughly in favour of good Anglo-
American relations in the summer of 1921 when one section 
of his Cabinet bitterly resented American claims to naval 
. . h . . 8 parity wit Britain ."  In  addition , there seems to be 
some evidence that Edward VIII , as Prince of Wales and 
later the Duke of Windsor , was sympathetic towards the 
Nazi regime, and the German government perceived the 
9 existence of a strong royal influence in certain case s .  
Whilst British official reaction was obviously 
the most important concern of the German foreign policy 
makers they also sought wider reactions than the purely 
governmental .  These wider reactions can be gleaned from 
the British press . In contributing to the general debate 
on foreign policy , the press corps also helped influence 
German perception of British reaction to German foreign 
l . . . . . 10  po icy initiatives . It should be noted, however , that 
whilst in some situations wider opinion as expressed in 
the press can affect the government, the government can 
similarly affect the wider opinion . This is c learly 
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acknowledged by the German Ambassador when just after German 
occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 , he warned that :  
The overall picture • • .  recalls . . .  in certain 
respects the situation as it was in 1914 . Then , 
too , public opinion was at first inclined to be 
favourably disposed towards the Central Powers . 
The Sarajevo murder was univer sally condemned, 
and everyone agreed that Serbia thoroughly de­
served exemplary punishment .  When the storm 
clouds gathered menacingly , however, the pic­
ture quickly changed, and then transformed itself 
with astonishing speed into its exact opposite , 
into a picture , that i s ,  of a suddenly united na­
tional front , standing with one accord behind its 
leaders . 1 1  
With this  warning i n  mind, i t  would be useful to take 
a closer look at the British press in the 1930 ' s .  The Time s ,  
"whose editors over much of the [twentietB century have 
broadly conceived it to be their duty to support the Govern-
ment of the day ,  at least in the field of foreign affair s ,  
and expound its views11, 12 was under the editorship of Geoffrey 
Dawson . The Deputy Editor was Robert Barrington-Ward, who 
"by the spring of 1936  • . .  had become almost solely responsi­
ble for the treatment of  Anglo-German relations . 111 3  Both 
Dawson and Barrington-Ward were pro-German and it was The 
Times ' contention during the post-Versailles period that 
"justice did not become inj ustice because a dictator demanded 
•t ,.1 4  1. • The Times' policy during the period under review can 
be described as pro-German , but it will become c lear that 
it was not unreservedly so. Dawson summarized The Times ' 
policy toward Germany in a letter to Anthony Winn , one-time 
Parl iamentary Correspondent for The Times .  He wrote: 
:7 
�he Times does no� cherish the smal lest hope of 
a genuine friendship with the Nazi. regime as it 
exists at present .  Its hope , on the contrary , is  
of  a genuine friendship with the German PEOPLE, 
whatever form of Government they may choose . • • •  
I do not myself believe that the system will 
last forever . B�t in any case I am convinced 
that the best way to consolidate and perpetuate it 
would be by staging a worldwide war on an issue 
that would be profoundly misinterpreted , not only 
in this country and in Germany , but in the dominions 
and the United States .  Similarly, I am convinced 
that British rearmament and organization must go 
forward with redoubled vigour if we are ever to 
make the German people frny italic@. cry halt to 
an insane competition .l � 
The subtle differentiation between government and peo-
ple is one which is  particularly importan t .  I t  will be seen 
that whilst the Nazi regime was regarded with some suspicion 
in many quarters , it was felt that the German people had 
genuine grievances resulting from the Versailles Treaty . 
The stance of the Manchester Guardian was similar 
to that of The Times . Whilst the politics of the Nazi 
regime were anathema to The Guardian , the grievances against 
Versailles which were a strong part of the Nazi platform 
were seen as just by W .  P .  Crozier, the editor of the paper • 
" . knowing what the Nazi regime and its ideas must lead 
to • • .  lJhe Manchester Guardiailwas unable conscientiously 
to oppose various demands based upon what it deemed genuine 
grievances in which Britain had complied at Versailles . 
In 1935 , Crozier wrote that : 
" 
• it simply won ' t  do , in my opinion , to treat 
Germany as an outlaw, or a mad dog ; she is . entitled 
to have ' equality ' ,  whether she is run by Nazis or 
Co nununists or anyone else,  and she has to be given 
the opportunity of coming into the pacts that are 
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being made around her . It  does not follow that this 
policy will succeed, but it seems to me to be the 
only course that is politically wise . " 17 
It should be noted , however , that whilst backing certain of 
Germany ' s  demands ,  The Guardian did condemn some internal 
policies of the Nazi Government--particularly the persecution 
of Jews and Christians , and the concentration camps . 
The Times and The Manchester Guardian were probably 
the two most important of what can be termed ' the quality 
press ' ,  however , other newspapers must be cons idered . 
The Daily Telegraph , which merged with the Morning 
Post in 1937 , was a conservative and imperialist paper which 
supported the National Government . There was ,  however , con-
siderable disagreement with the government on the correct 
treatment of Nazi Germany . The general l ine taken by the 
Daily Telegraph was that of Winston Churc�ill and Anthony 
Eden ,  one which demanded a tough policy with no concessions 
to tne Nazi regime . The Observer, a Sunday newspaper , under 
the editorship of J .  L .  Gavin ,  fundamentally believed that 
Germany wanted peace . Although not wholly in  favour of 
some of the radical policies of the Nazi regime , Gavin 
clearly felt that an agreement with Germany was not only 
possible and desirable , but also of paramount importance . 
Running parallel to this advocacy of co-operation was an 
emphasis on the need for ·British rearmament . The Sunday 
Times was in a much more ambiguous position . Its owner , 
Lord Kemsley , was pro-Hitler and to some extent influenced 
his newspapers in this direction . The editor of the Sunday 
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Times was w. w. Hadley , and the editorial page supported 
the Government whilst favouring an Anglo-German settlement . 
The major spokesman on foreign affairs was Herbert Sidebotham , 
who signed himself "Scrutator " ,  followed a most extreme 
line of appeasement . There were,  therefore , three indepen­
dent pulls of the Sunday Times which sometimes led to con­
fl icting comments . 
The popular press in the 1930 's fell into two main 
groups--the Rothermere and Beaverbrook presses . Lord 
Rothermere , like Kemsley; . was extremely pro-Hitler and 
strongly influ�ced his newspapers--the Daily Mai l ,  the 
Daily Mirror and the London Evening News . Lord Beaverbrook 
also influenced the policy of his newspapers ,  and in par­
ticular that of the Daily Expres s ,  however , he believed in 
the isolation of Britain from European affairs and stronger 
ties with the United States . To this end reports on Euro­
pean affiars were very limited . In  addition to these two 
large newspaper groups there were two other newspapers to 
be considered--the News Chronicle and the Daily Heral d .  
The News Chronicle maintained an anti-German stance, and 
was ,  in fact,  the newspaper which most annoyed the German 
Government . The Daily Herald , the Labour Party newspaper, 
had considerable internal conflicts which diffused its 
comment on a variety of subjects including Germany . Since 
1929  the majority of shares in the company were held by 
Odhams Press , which regarded the paper as a commercial 
concern ; the paper , however, also felt responsibilities to 
10 
the Labour Party which was itself internally divided . The 
Daily Herald , therefore, took no really original stand on 
the German question . 
Another part of the elite which sought to influence 
foreign policy was the parl iamentary group. There are two 
main groups in this category which assumed broadly similar 
stances .  First , there were some individuals in Parliament,  
that is to say elder statesmen , whose position of respect 
was such that they could have a profound effect on British 
polic y .  Probably the most important people in this group 
were Sir Austen Chamberlain and Lord David Cecil who both 
regarded Nazi Germany with some suspicion . It  should be 
noted that the importance of these men was freely acknowledged 
18 by the Germans . Secondly,  there was a group of younger men 
headed by Winston Churchill ,  later j oined by Anthony Eden 
after his resignation from the government . This group, which 
consistently advocated a hard-line policy with regard to Ger-
many, was less influential , but its influence increased as  
the policy of appeasement began to fail . 
Having briefly discussed the groups who were · reacting 
to German foreign policy moves ,  and generally outlined their 
positions,  I will now turn to the second problem--to what are 
those groups reacting . First, they are reacting to obvious 
foreign policy moves , that is to say, moves which involve 
other members of the international community .  Actions in 
this category include Germany ' s  withdrawal from the League 
of Nations and the Disarmament Conference,  on October 14, 1933; 
1 1  
and the reoccupation of the Rhineland , on March 7 ,  1936 , 
for example.  Secondly , there are actions which less ob­
viously fall into the category of foreign policy . When 
Germany reintroduced conscription on March 1 6 ,  1935 , there 
were two interpretations of the move . On the one hand , the 
reintroduction of conscription can be regarded purely as 
a part of foreign pol ic y ,  that is to say, it changed the 
nature of the German Armed Forces from a defensive force to 
an offensive force, and, therefore , broke the Treaty of Ver­
sailles . On the other hand , the move can be explained in 
domestic terms , in that by reintroducing conscription the 
employment s ituation was eased by taking away surplus labour 
from the job market . Furthermore, the service industries 
would  receive a boost which in turn would stimulate the 
economy as a whole .  It could be argued then , that the reintro­
duction of conscription was not a purely foreign policy move . 
Finally, there are some issues which are entirely domestic 
in character , but which , nevertheless ,  elic ited some response 
from Britain. This is particularly true of the period, 
early in 1933 , when the persecution of the Jews , Christians 
and Communists in Germany came in for criticism from some 
groups in Britain . Whilst the British Government maintained 
its traditional policy of non-interference in the domestic 
policy of another country unless British subjects were involved , 
there were groups who reacted strongly to the ?ituation . Ques­
tions were raised in Parliament and criticism was expressed 
in the press ( see infra) . Furthermore ,  these criticisms 
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induced a response from the German Government ,  on the one 
hand expressed through diplomatic channels , and on the -
other by stepping up action against Jews . Thus , when con­
sidering the problem of what the British are reacting to 
in terms of German foreign policy , the broadest concept of 
foreign policy must be used , so that all German actions 
which elicited some kind of response in Britain are included 
in the analysis . Moves in all three categories elicited 
some kind of response from Britain , and , therefore , contri­
buted to the formulation of British opinion vis-a-vis 
Germany . 
Source material for this period falls  into three 
main categories: the official; newspaper reports ; and per­
sonal diaries and letters . In the official category there 
are again three categories ,  that i s  to say diplomatic docu­
ments , cabinet minute s ,  and the Parliamentary reports pub­
lished as Hansard . I have been fortunate enough to have 
had access to al l of these sources , but despite their in­
disputable accuracy there are some problems with each of 
these . Diplomatic documents rarely express opinion per se: 
the dispatches from Embassies are usually informational ; 
the dispatches from the Foreign Office instructional . The 
position of individuals ,  therefore , only occasional ly becomes 
explicit in these documents . For general reactions ,  then, 
and overall decisions the documents are vital, but for an 
indication of how decisions were reached they are not always 
too helpfu l .  The Cabinet minutes ,  which should give a great 
1 3  
deal of insight into the decision-making process , are not 
verbatim accounts of Cabinet meetings,  but reports . It has 
been claimed that the reports often have little relation 
th . 
. . 1 . 19  to e discussions that went on at particu ar meetings , 
and merely reflect the sense of the meeting . The reports 
of  the debates in the House of Commons do give a good insight 
into dissenting opinion in the official world . Care, however, 
must be taken in assessing these reports .  · In an article 
in The Journal of Modern History , for example ,  R. H .  Powers20  
compares Winston Churchill ' s  statements both inside and out-
side the House of Commons with his voting record on foreign 
policy issue s ,  concluding that although he spoke vehemently 
against a soft line with regard to Germany he did not reflect 
this in his voting in Parliament .  This analys i s ,  however , 
reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the British Par-
liamentary system . Without going into great detail  on practice 
and procedure in the House of Commons , it should be remembered 
that s ince the 1920 ' s  and 30 ' s  members of Parliament usually 
voted along strong party lines . Churchill ' s  behaviour 
merely reflects a desire to maintain his party in power , that 
i s  to say he pref erred to try to persuade the Government 
to change policy than actively aid its downfal l .  Therefore , 
more credence should be given to opinions expressed in speeches 
than opinions expressed i·n the division lobbies of the House 
of Commons . 
Newspaper reports ,  and particularly editorial articles , 
provide an excellent source for reaction to German foreign 
14 
policy . Newspaper articles provide an immediate and accurate 
view of the attitude of that newspaper to events , and although 
attitudes may change the immediate reaction is important ,  
especially in this study which attempts to plot any change 
in attitude .  I have been fortunate to  have access to The 
Times ( London) for the whole of the period under review and 
to other newspapers for certain events , particularly the 
reoccupation of the Rhineland in March , 1936 . I have also 
made great use of F .  R. Gannon ' s  book , The British Press and 
21  Germany 1936-19 3 9 ,  which includes an  excellent introduction 
to the whole period of this study . 
Finally , amongst the contemporary sources , there are 
a number of collections of personal diaries and letters . 
Until recently ,  it was not usual to write a diary with view 
to publication , and , therefore, they tend not to have the 
distortion of hindsight from which some autobiographies suffer . 
There are two notable political diarists who cover the 1930 ' s :  
2 2  Tom Jones , an advisor to Lloyd-George and supporter of 
the National Government; and Harold Nicolson, 2 3  a backbench 
M . P .  who supported the Conservative dominated National Govern-
ment . Both men give excel lent insight , not only to their 
own personal views on matters of relations with Germany , but 
also of more generally held attitudes toward Germany both 
insider and outside Parliament . In addition to Jones and 
Nicolson , there is a further important commentator of events ,  
J .  C .  C .  Davidson , an influential man in the Conservative 
Party administration, whose memoirs and papers are an important 
24  source . 
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An additional primary source to be considered is auto­
biographies and memoirs . . There is also an abundance of material 
in this category since everyone concerned--political leaders ,  
backbenchers ,  career civil servants and diplomats , and jour­
nalists--wrote memoirs . The biggest problem with this kind 
of writing is that it tends to become a vehicle for ex post 
facto j ustification of action rather than an objective study 
of events . Although the actual course of events is never dis­
puted , the changes of opinion are slurred or not admitted . 
Political memoirs tend to be least reliable in this respect, 
and Winston Churchi ll ' s  memoir-history of the Second World 
War , although of prime importance ,  seems to degenerate into 
"I told you so" in the volume dealing with the pre-war years . 25 
Anthony Eden ' s  Facing the Dictators26  suffers similarly ,  whilst 
Sir Robert Vansittart The Mist Procession , although reticent , 
tends to corroborate his sometimes vehement anti-Nazi feelings 
which are well documented elsewhere . 27  There is also a pro­
blem with this group of material inasmuch as those considered 
by history--both academic and popular--as appeasers seek to 
vindicate their actions in their autobiographies . 2 8  It would 
be wrong to ignore this source material but it should be treated 
with care in order that a more balanced view may be achieved . 
There is a considerable amount of secondary source 
material which covers this period , from biographies to mono­
graphs . For many years there appeared to be fairly general 
agreement amongst historians as to the origins of and responsi­
bilities for the outbreak of World War I I .  This unusual 
16 
homogeneity amongst historians has disappeared since 1960 , 
and there are now two schools of thought which have been 
1 1  d h h d d . . . 2 9  ca e t e ort o ox an revisionist. The ' revisionist 
school ' is led by A. J .  P .  Taylor , w. N .  Medlicott and D. c. Watt , 
who have questioned the mutually dependent theses that,  first , 
Hitler came to power with a set of long-term aims intent on 
achieving German hegemony in EuroFe; and secondly , that although 
upset by Hitler ' s  initial actions , England was determined to 
take the national istic steam out of Hitler ' s  policies by re-
moving German grievances . Although it would be easy to com-
pletely ignore this problem of interpretation , since most of 
the attack on the ' orthodox ' view relies upon economic consi­
derations and internal conflicts in Germany30  which are out-
s ide the scope of this study , the differing interpretations 
wil l  encroach upon this thesis because the secondary sources 
do differ . Having noted that there will be differing inter-
pretations in secondary sources , it would seem appropriate , 
whilst bearing them in mind , to set them to one side in the 
consideration of foreign policy . 
II 
There is a certain continuity to British foreign 
policy which derives from a number of gee-political consi-
d . 1 erations . Probably the most important of these considera-
tions is the fact that Britain is an island, dependent upon 
international trade to maintain its economy . This factor 
dictates that Britain , in general , favours the status quo 
or  at least non-revolutionary change as being the most con-
ducive atmosphere for international trade .  The period bet-
ween the two World Wars was no exception . On November 9 ,  
192 2 , Lord Curzon , then the British Foreign Secretary , made 
a foreign policy statement in the House of Lord s .  I n  it  
he stated : 
(!3ritain haaj always felt that the economic re­
covery of Germany was essential to Europe, and that 
she ought to be given a chance to1regain her own · 
equilibrium and self-respect .  For this reason we 
have always been disposed to favour her admission 
to the League of Nations when she made application 
to do so. 
I certainly would not be a party to the evasion 
by Germany of just obligation s .  I would not favour 
her at the expense of our old Ally. I am still 
hopeful that we shall arrive at a solution by peace­
ful means and agreement , and I believe that any 
arbitrary measures would meet with failure . 2 
This speech clearly illustrates the feeling in Britain 
that Germany ' s  recovery was linked to a general European re-
covery and , more particularly, the recovery of Britain . For 
the status quo to be restored , it was necessary for Germany to 
17  
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re-enter the community of nation·s ,  to resu�e her place with ·• 
the other powers .  This was · one of the most important factors 
which influenced Britain ' s  attitude to Germany during the 
inter-war years.  Another factor was a general feeling that 
the Versail les settlement was ·in some way misguided , even 
harsh. This feeling is reflected first in Keynes' polemic 
The Economic Consequences of the Peace , which appeared in 
19 2 1 ;  it was reiterated in 1933  by Harold Nicolson in his 
book , Peacemaking 1919 ;  and in R. B .  McCullu rn ' s  Public Opinion 
and the Last Peace which first appeared in 1 9 44 . It can also 
be seen in some of the first histories of the inter-war period , 
for example , E. H .  Carr ' s  International Relations ·Between the 
Two World Wars ,  1919-19 39 , which first appeared in 1 9 4 7 .  
Finally, there wa.s a general loathing of war . The First 
World War was entered with a spirit of adventure and finished 
with a spirit of revulsion. It was a war to end wars ,  and 
there was a feeling that a similar catastroph.e should be 
averted at all costs . These thre� factor s ,  then, influenced 
British reaction to Germany during the inter-war period . 
It was clearly seen that reparations would hinder 
German recovery, and Britain , therefore, did not back Belgium 
and France when they occupied the Ruhr in 192 3 ,  in an attempt 
to exact reparations . In fact , in February , 1923 , Herbert 
Asquith stated in Parliament that "any steps that you frhe 
governmen1] take or propose must be of such a kind that what­
ever you ask or whatever you seek to enforce shall  be such 
that it does not destroy , or even paralyse , the economic life 
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of Germany , and thereby. undermine the whole fa.bric of inter­
national trade.  " 3 When the Dawes Plan was sugges·ted in 19 2 4, 
therefore , the British were eager to accept . The plan was 
an attempt to establish some stability in the German economy , 
and under it German �eparation payments. were rescheduled, a 
foreign loan was to be floated , and Germany was to be restored 
to full economic control of her whole territory . This plan 
can be seen as the first revision of the Versailles Treaty, 
and the first step towards restoring Germany to full member­
ship in the international community . 
The next step which augured the demise of Versailles 
was the Locarno Treaty of 192 5 ,  signed by Britain , France, 
Belgium, Germany , and Italy. Under the treaty , the Franco­
German and the Belgo-German frontiers were guaranteed. The 
general implication of the treaty was that unless the obliga­
tions of Versailles were reinforced by voluntary negotiated 
treaties , they lacked binding force . 4 Locarno was fol lowed 
by the Young Plan of 1929 ,  which reduced reparation payments 
and revised the schedule for repayment .  The plan was nego­
tiated in conjunction with the proposed Allied evacuation 
of the Rhineland in 1930 , some five years before the date 
set at Versailles, 1 9 3 5 .  The international monetary crisis 
of the early 1930 ' s ,  however ,  led to a declaration by Germany 
in 1931  that it could not resume reparation payments at that 
time , and impl ied that it would not be able to in the future . 
In January, 19 3 2 ,  the German Chancellor, Dr . Bruning, made 
the statement that "Germany was not in a position to pay 
�o 
5 reparations now or at any foreseeable time i n  the future . "  
The diplomatic exchanges between Britain and Germany early i n  
19 32 , prior to the Lausanne Conference called to settle the 
reparation problem, strongly suggest that Britain was sym-
pathetic to Germany ' s  plight whilst not wishing to offend 
France.6 At the Lausanne Conference,  Britain acted as media-
tor between the French and the Germans , and a formula was 
drawn up i n  an effort to solve the problem of reparations pay-
ments i n  the context of the economic climate of the early 1930 ' s .  
On July 12 , the Prime Minister , Ramsey MacDonald , said i n  Par-
l iament : 
I make this claim :  that the Conference and its 
results can lead to a settlement of this question of 
reparations which l ies somewhere about the root of 
every economic trouble which has overtaken the world 
since the War, which has falsified national Budget s ,  
has placed i n  the centre of Europe a country whose 
financial position is a menace to the whole world , 
and has done much to throw every national economy 
out of gear .  While reparations last there can be 
no complete industrial recovery . 7 
The Times editorial of the same day fully endorsed the 
government stance over Lausanne , and the letters to the editor 
over the next few days further supported this view. 8 The 
British attitude at Lausanne can be seen as a continuation 
of previous policy. That is to say that Britain was trying 
to encourage the German economy and re-establish Germany ·i n  
tne international community, thereby restoring the international 
status quo in which atmosphere of stability it was hoped that 
British interest would flourish. 
The next problem to be confronted was that of armaments .  
Part V of  the Treaty of Versailles l imited German armaments , 
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which "were imposed as. a means of securing the peace of Europe . " 9  
There were , however , no such limitations on the victorious 
countries , and Germany felt this to be unjust and discriminatory 
treatment . I n  February , 1932 , the Disarmament Conference opened 
in  Geneva , and it was then that the Germans demanded equality 
of status . Whilst the British Government was sympathetic to 
what was considered a just grievance,  there were two major 
stumbling blocks . First, the French felt that their demand 
for security would be j eopardized by the German demand for · 
equality , and , secondly, it was feared that having achieved 
equality the Germans would proceed to settle certain terri-
torial differences with Poland , an ally of France , by force . 
The success of the Lausanne Conference ,  which was conducted 
whilst the deadlock in Geneva continued , in September prompted 
the new German Government of Franz von Papen to withdraw from 
the Disarmament Conference until its demands were met . For 
the next few months some kind of formula to break the deadlock 
was sought . Britain was aware of " the sense of grievance on 
the side of Germany . •  (and wa� ready and anxious to join 
the other Governments represented at Geneva in  s incere and 
far-reaching steps to remove it . 11 10  At the same time , however ,  
the British were aware of the problems that might arise ,  stating: 
I t  is not open to question that the hesitation which 
may have shown itself in certain quarters in  granting 
the German claim does not proceed from any desire to 
inflict upon Germany a permanent inferiority of status , 
which her people would naturally resent, but from a 
deep anxiety as to the use which might be made of the 
new situation and of the dangers which would result 
to the tranquility of Europe if an express assurance 
as to the peaceful intentions of Germany was not 
forthcoming .  
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By December , worries seem to have been removed and a formula 
agreed upon for the re-entry of Germany into the Disarmament 
Conference . On December 1 1 ,  an agreement was reached by 
Britain , France, Germany , Italy and t he United States which 
stated that : 
The Governments ·of the United Kingdom,  France and 
Italy have declared that one of the principles that 
should guide the Conference on Disarmament s hould be 
the grant to Germany , and to the other Powers disarmed 
by treaty, of equality of rights in a system which 
would provide security for all nation s ,  and that t he 
principle should find itself embodied in the conven­
tion containing the conclusions of the Disarmament 
Conference . 12  
During the 1920 ' s  and early 1930 ' s  then , with the general 
agreement and sympathy of the British governments , certain of 
what Ge·rmany regarded as inequitable parts of the Versailles 
Treaty were revised . This was even carried so far as the re-
cognition , in principle , of Germany ' s  right to equality of 
armaments . Germany was like any other nation-state , and as 
such had the same obligations as all other nation-states, under 
the Versailles Treaty it was denied the means to do this . 
Germany did not have full sovereignty over all its territory; 
and did not have the means to defend itself against possible 
aggression . It seemed only right , in British eyes , that 
Germany s hould , therefor e ,  be restored t he means to fulfill 
its functions as a nation-state, and conduct its affairs 
as an equal member of the international community . Further-
more , in its attempts to remove German grievances , Britain 
seemed happy to alter the provisions of the treaties made 
at Versailles . 
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Despite there being many concessions , there was a 
realisation that the rise of nationalistic forces--parti­
cularly of Hitler--could lead to serious problems in the 
future . On March 23 ,  1932 , therefore , the ' ten year rule ' ,  
which envisaged no major war for the next ten years , was 
abandoned by the Cabinet on the insistence of the Chiefs 
0£ Staff . Although this was partially due to the Manchurian 
Cris is , the rise of Hitler also played a 'major part in that 
decision . 13  By 1932 , then, the British attitude to Germany 
was not unequivoca l .  That is to sa� that , whilst recogni­
zing and wishing to remove just grievances , the British 
Government also recognized � possible German threat to 
international security . 
Before moving on to an analysis of specific British 
reactions to German foreign policy during the period 1933-
1936 , it  might be well to pause in order to outline the 
general position of the various groups to be considered 
by 1933 , in order to illustrate more clearly what, if any , 
changes take place.  The attitude of the British Government , 
as has been seen , was somewhat ambivalen t .  Whilst the govern­
ments , of whatever nature, were generally sympathetic to 
limited revisionism in order to remove the injustices of 
Versailles , they were also made aware , by 1932 , of the dangers 
of a nationalistic government in Berlin . In Parliament , there 
were no clearly defined positions . The Conservatives fol lowed 
their leaders ' policies , with one or two notable exceptions 
like Austen Chamberlain and Winston Churchill , whose dissidence 
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became more important and influential over the few years 
before the war . The Liberals were on the whole sympathetic 
to the kind of limited revisionism that the Government pro-
posed , and the Labour Party· followed a similar l ine . In  fact,  
the Labour M . P .  ' s  main foreign policy ideas rested upon disar-
mament and peaceful solution of international differences . 
Clem Attlee , who was elected Labour Leader· in 19 35 , wrote :  
It is , I think , fair to say that until 1 9 3 5  the Parlia­
mentary Labour Party had given little or no serious 
attention to defence problems . The party had held of­
fice in a minority government on two occasions . . • 
when it had been laid down that there was no danger 
of war for ten years.  There were, indeed , no poten­
tially hostile powers of any military strength , whil e ,  
at the League of Nation s ,  a l l  the emphasis was on dis­
armament . In these circumstances , it was natural that 
no consideration should be given to technical problems 
of defence. 1 4  
Other than a routine vote against Service Estimates ,  therefore, 
the Labour Party gave little serious attention to international 
relations and defenc e .  The press , in general supported the 
government of the day . They shared the feeling of the injustices 
of Versailles , and a feel ing of sympathy for Germany, but at 
the same time were aware of the problems that could be created 
by a resurgent Germany . There was ,  however , one strong diss ident 
voic e .  Winston Churchill was strongly opposed to the decisions 
of the Lausanne Conference and the recognition of Germany' s  
right to equality o f  armaments . On July 1 1 ,  Churchill made 
a strong statement in Parliament on the question of reparations 
1 5  and the Lausanne Conference.  I n  November , h e  raised the 
question of armaments ,  stating : 
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Do not delude yourselve s .  Do not let His Maj est y ' s  
Government believe • . .  that a l l  Germany i s  asking for 
is equal status . . • . That is not what Germany is 
seeking . Al l these bands of sturdy Teutonic youths , 
marching through the streets and roads of Germany 
. •  
are not looking for status . They are looking for 
weapons ,  and , when they have the weapons , believe 
me they will then ask for the rr�urn of lost terri­
tories and lost colonies 
. • • .  
Church il l ' s  opinion , however , was not widely held . The general 
public ,  if various analyses are to be bel ieved , 17 shared the 
sympathy of the other groups , and seemed much influenced by 
them in their reaction to Germany. 
On January 3 0 ,  1933 , Hitler was appointed Chancellor 
of Germany. Initially, his coming to power gave little rise 
to concern . This is generally reflected by Sir Harold Rumbold, 
the British Ambassador in Berlin,  in his report on the situation 
in Germany. He stated that : 
. • •  the President seems to have followed constitu­
tional procedure in entrusting Hitler , as leader of 
the strongest party in the Reichstag , with the Chan­
cel lorship . . •  
2 . That Hitler should , contrary to his repeated 
assevervations in the past ,  have consented to accept 
the Chancellorship without insisting on his claim to 
exclusive power , can perhaps only be explained by a 
tardy realisation of the difficulties of his own 
position . . • • 
6 .  It wi ll probabl y  be necessary to await the 
statement of the Government programme in the Reich­
stag , in order to learn the lines along which the 
Hitler Government propose to conduct their internal 
and foreign policy. 18  
Parliament was not in session at this time and the Cabinet 
was meeting to d iscuss other more pressing internal matters , 
so the only official reaction comes from this telegram. From 
this evidence ,  Hitler is regarded as an ordinary pol itician,  
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seeking power by the usual means . The 'wait and see ' atti-
tude, however, does imply some reservations .  The press also 
reflect this view . In The Times editorial of January 3 1 ,  
it was stated : 
That Herr Hitler, who leads the strongest party in 
the Reichstag and obtained almost a third of more 
than 3 5 , 000 , 000 votes in the last election , should 
be given the chance of showing that he is something 
more than an orator and agitator was always desirable 
• . • . In this country • . .  as in France , the effect 
of the change of Government on the German attitude 
toward armaments will be watched with some misgivings . 
But in fairness to the Nazis , it must be admitted that 
they have in fact said little more on the subject 
of German disabilities under the Treaty of Versailles 
than the most constitutional German parties • • • .  
But in the last resort , the future of German 
Parliamentarianism appears to depend mainly upon the 
unknown quantity of Herr Hitler ' s  constructive powers , 
and of his abi lity for the first time to exercise 
power with responsibility . 19 
To this calm acceptance with reservations must be added the 
view that Hitler ' s  power was tempered and controlled by other 
elements inside and oustide the Reichstag , and could be transi-
tory . The Economist editorialized , characterizing the German 
people as a horse : 
Herr Hitler has been hoist into the saddle .  It is now to 
be seen if he can keep his seat,  with Freiherr van Papen 
perched on the crupper behind him and digging in his 
East-Prussian spurs . . .  what will the creature feel 
like now, when Hitler cracks his whip and Von Papen 
applies his spurs . . .  with Hugenberg (The Nationalist 
Leader) running behind and twisting his tail . . . •  
Will the poor animal make a frantic effort and impale 
himself on the spikes? Or  will he wildly plunge and 
rear and throw his riders . . .  ?20  
There is some concern expressed in  the article ,  however, it 
is felt that Hitler, brought to power by the same configura-
tion of pressure groups which had established and overthrown 
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two previous governments , might only hold power for a short 
period . It is noted in the artic le ,  however , that the Junkers 
may have unleased something which they would not be able to 
control . Typical of this calm yet concerned attitude was 
the opinion expressed in a letter to Thomas Jones , an impor-
tant member of the Conservative Party : "Germany I cannot 
understand • • .  My last informant tells me that van Papen 
is a far more sinister f igure than Hitler , for Hitler will 
turn out to have no plans , whereas van Papen has a very de-
finite one . "  The writer goes on to echo ideas about the in-
justice of Versailles ,  writing : "The responsibility for Ger-
many ' s  plight today l ies upon those who made the Treaty 
of Versailles--England , France and President Wilson . If 
they had pursued the policy which Wellington pursued after 
Waterloo , the moderates would have, in my ju�gment , permanently 
21  controlled ... " 
This measured response was not universal . Again 
Winston Churchill saw some danger in the events in Germany . 
The only evidence for this is his retrospective history of 
the war, however , it seems valid since his public statements 
before and after the event support this view. Calling these 
events "deadly changes , •! he paints a vivid picture of the 
potential dangers he foresaw after Hitler ' s  accession to 
power , especially in connection with the recognition of 
Germany ' s  right to equality of armaments . 22  
The undercurrent of concern common to all groups 
became increasingly more distinct by the events .of the ensuing 
months .  The issue of The Communist Party newspaper , Rote 
Fahne, of January 3 1  was suppressed for calling for a general 
strike against the new government . On February 1 ,  the Reich-
stag was dissolved and March elections were announced . On 
February 2 ,  all meetings and demonstrations of the German 
Communist Party were forbidden , and secret Communist arms 
caches were seized throughout Germany . As early as February 
6 ,  the British Ambassador was sending reports of the unscru-
pulous propaganda methods being used and the exclusive use 
. b . f . d . . 2 3  of the National roadcasting system or Nazi propagan 1z1ng . 
There was , however , no condemnation of these methods since 
Hitler stil l ,  at the very least , was paying lip service to 
the Constitution . Reporting on Hitler ' s  campa�gn methods 
a Times editorial of February 17 stated tha t :  
I t  i s  to make no pronouncement on policy in the 
ordinary sense of the term, but to proclaim a poli­
tical creed, to impose it with all  the resources 
of official power upon the whole nationa, and to 
denounce ,  malign and thwart its opponents , open or 
supposed . . . . The electoral campaign of political 
opponents is being hampered by arbitrary devices , 
such as the suppression of their newspapers ,  the 
prohibition of meetings and even of the use of 
placards . 24  · 
Having reported that , however , the Times goes on to actually 
mitigate such actions by echoin9 the line it used on Hit ler ' s  
accession to power by stating that "Herr Hitler has in fact 
• made a great name for himself in opposition . He has 
now to show that he is capable of constructive leadership 
in office . it is well understood /!ibroad] that the 
conversion from demagogy to responsibility cannot happen 
overnight . 11 2 5· The Economist took a more critical view, 
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however, writing "Not content with suppressing the freedom 
of the Press , the Nazis are now carrying on their war against 
l iberalism on all fronts • •  . . But the most significant 
events have been the apparently uncontrolled attacks . 
private individuals--Gentiles of Liberal opinions and Jews 
upon 
of every persuasion . . . . Reports of the political tension 
in Germany continued to reach the Foreign Off ice and the Arnbas-
sador did report that under the prevailing circumstances the 
foundations of popular liberty and representative government 
ld b d . d 27 cou e un ermine . The situation was somewhat diffused , 
however, when Hitler advised his followers not to attend 
meetings of the Centre party because of the disturbances that 
had been caused previously--which move The Times lauded . 28 
This relief was , however , temporary . Four days later, on 
February 27 ,  the Reichstag building in Berlin was burnt down, 
a Dutch Conununist was arrested in the burning building and 
the German Communists were blamed . There was much specula-
tion as to who was responsible for the fire , and the British 
Ambassador sharply suspected that the fire had been staged 
by the Nazis . Hitler, however, continued to exploit the 
position of uncertainty and a decree suspending six articles 
of the Constitution concerning personal freedom , secrecy of 
posts and telegraphs , free speech , and the inviolability 
of domicile and property was issued . Later, all Communist 
Deputies and party officials were arrested . Some elements 
of the popu lar British press critici zed the German Govern-
ment , but The Times seemed to accept, for the time being at 
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least , the official German version , pointing out , µowever , 
that "in  the present state of Europe the continuance of 
this high tension in Berlin must remain a dange� to inter­
national peace . 11 2 9  Furthermore , it  was C:oring and not Hitler , 
who received the bulk of foreign criticism . 30 · 
The renewed and more virulent repression in Germany 
d id give rise to some concern in Britain about British subjects 
and property in Germany , and the concern resulted in a question 
being asked in the House of Commons· on March 1 .  The Foreign 
Secretary , Sir John Simon , expressed every confidence that 
the German Government was , and would continue to carry out 
its responsibility toward the lives and interests of British 
subjects . 31  In a message to the British Ambassador on the 
following day , Simon mentioned the concern in England regarding 
German Jews . Whilst he authorized Rumbold to make represen-
tations to the German Government concerning British interests , 
he maintained the traditional British stand of non-interven-
tion in the internal affairs of other nations stating : "I 
fully realise that we have no locus standi to make represen-
tations as regards German subjects . Despite this 
position , the Anglo-Jewish Association still made represen­
tations directly to the Government and indirectly through 
letters to the press regarding the plight of German Jews . 
At this time, however, there was not a tremendous amount of 
interest shown in the Jewish problem. The main concern was 
about the elections and their results . Although the press 
in England did not reflect it,  there was an uneasy feeling 
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amongst the British press correspondents in Berlin ,  due 
to the attitude of the German Government , which was ex-
tremely sensitive to the reports of the foreign press 
corps in Germany . 
Despite the tension that was felt in Germany , the 
elections of March 5 took place without too much disturbance . 
The result of the election was an overall  majority for a 
coalition of the Right led by Hitler and the National Socia-
lists , and supported by Hugenberg and the Nationalists . The 
fact that a majority government had at last been elected in 
Germany was greeted with a certain amount of relief in 
Britain . It seemed that , for the next four years at least, 
there would be a stable government in Berlin , and the pros-
pects for an agreement on the question of disarmament seemed 
good . Hitler in government was still very much an unknown 
quantity and the official opinion , therefore , reflected 
this . The attitude was very much one of "wait and see , "  
as it had been when Hitler became Chancellor in January . 3 3  
The Times also reiterated its previous s tatements ( see supra ) , 
adding the final , warning corollary : '' • other nations 
will watch to see whether he [HitleiJ can maintain the 
position of Germany as a 'good neighbour ' in Europe that 
Herr Stressemann and Dr. Bru0ning have built up with so much 
1 . . . 3 4  rea patriotism i n  recent years . "  
Over the next two and a half weeks , th� Nazis laid 
hold·  to the entire administration . The dispatches from the 
Embassy in Berlin in chronic l ing this "revolution " emphasized 
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that no policy had emerged , there are , however , indications 
in these texts of the general direction the German Govern­
ment seemed to be taking . The two most disturbing trends 
were the continuation of the repressive measures seen prior 
to the elections , and the emergence of Hitler ' s  attitude to 
disarmament and collective security . On March 1 1 ,  Hitler 
made a speech in which he expressed l ittle faith in internc­
tional solidarity and stated that he was for force as the 
" eternal mother of rights . "  Just at this time the British 
and French were seeking some kind of disarmament formula  
in  Geneva . The excesses and unnecessary violence of the 
Na zis continued to be reported , and on March 2 1  the Ambas-
sador wrote in his di spatch : "The gaols and places of de-
tention are crowded at the moment with political prisoners 
. . 
. . ( and) His Majesty ' s  consuls report the summary arrests 
all over the country of officials and politicians belonging 
to the left . 11 3 5  The climax of these events was the passing 
of the Enabling Bill on March 23 which marked the beginning 
of Hitler ' s  dictatorial powers . 
The immediate official reaction to these events is 
unclear . The dispatches from Berlin are almost exclusively 
informational ,  and there is certainly no Cabinet discussion 
about the problem . The problem of disarmament and Jewish 
persecution were reported in the press . On March 1 1 ,  The 
Times reported : "Sul len and discontented before , Germany 
under Herr Hit ler has become clamorous and self-assertive ; 
and the claims which she puts forward have intensi!ied the 
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fears of neighboring countries that she me�ns to try to 
36 obtain satisfaction by force . "  The report continues 
with a pessimistic view of the poss ibilities for the Dis-
armament Conference ,  but shifts some of the blame to France 
for the tardy proposals before the Conference in Geneva . 
Had they been made s ix months earlier, it is argued , the 
situation in Germany might have been very different . 
The mood of the press in particular, and the country 
in general ,  was becoming increasingly anti-German during this 
period largely due to the systematic persecutions being carried 
out .  It should be pointed out here , however , that this anti-
German feeling is almost exclusively ant�-Na2i or Hitler . 
This subtle , and sometimes ambiguous sentiment becomes in-
creasingly important . Later in the period under review, the 
British Government tried on the one hand to assuage German 
demands whilst comi.ng to real ize that Germany under Hitler 
could be a very real threat to peace . Out of this prevailing 
mood , however, came two pleas of mitigation. On March 12 , 
Lloyd-George made a speech in the House of Commons , stating 
that : 
Germany did its best to carry that treaty (Versailles) 
through . • • . It was our part to see that we , and 
the other nations which signed the treaty , followed 
suit . But armaments have gone up year b� year while 
those of Germany have been kept down . . • . The 
result is that they ( the other European Nations) have 
driven Germany to an aggressive military dictatorship , 
which is a menace to the peace of the world and 
which is fatal to disarmament. 37 
Two weeks later the British Ambassador in Berlin sent 
a report to the Foreign Office stating: 
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6 .  Before the Hitlerite Government took office 
in February , tne Jewish problem in Germany was admit­
tedly becoming a serious. one . Ever. since the revo­
lution (1920 ) Jews have been given fair play ±n every 
walk of life in this country , with the result that 
their racial superior ity was asserting itself • . • .  
to an almost alarming extent . . • . In a country 
where they hardly amount to 2 per cent of the popu­
la t�on , they have practically monopolised some pro­
fessions and have obtained the plums of a great many 
others . • • . It is only natural that the academic 
youth of this country should bitterly resent the 
success of the Jews . . . •  38  
It should be noted here , however ,  that this is mitiga-
tion for the German people and not of the Nazis or Hitler . 
The persecution of the Jews continued with the announce-
ment of a boycott of Jewish shops , goods ,  lawyers and doctors 
from 10 a . m .  on April 1 .  It was further suggested that the 
number of Jews allowed to enter the learned professions should 
be limited . The measure was stated to be directed against 
Jewish agitation abroad . On March 3 0 ,  Sir John Simon, in 
the House of Commons , and Lord Hailsham, in the House of 
Lord s ,  answered questions about the boycott and stated the 
traditional British position--that there . was no question 
of British interference in the affairs of another country 
on behalf of the subjects of that other country . There 
were many letters in the newspapers condemning the proposed 
actions in Germany , and one or two giving tacit support to 
the Nazis . In the April 1 edition of The Economist ,  it was 
stated that one of the surest indices of a civilized country 
was the treatment of the Jews in it .  It  was claimed, further-
more , whilst Brita in , France, Holland, and America provided 
good examples for the treatment of Jews , Germany did not .  
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For twelve hours , from 1 0  a .m .  to 1 0  p .m .  on Saturday, 
April 1 ,  throughout Germany, there was a complete boycott 
of all  Jewish stores and services, including doctors and 
lawyers , strictly enforced by brown-shirts who barred 
entry to Jewish establishments . 'l'hat evening, in London, 
there was a meeting at  Whitechapel backed by an interdenomina­
tional group of Anglicans , Roman Catholics and Jews . The 
meeting received telegrams of support from leading members 
of the Labour Party--Lord Snowdon , George Lansbury , and Atlee--
and was used to denounce Germany ' s  treatment of the Jews . Al-
though the continuation of the boycott,  which was scheduled 
for the fol lowing Wednesday , was much less intensely enforced, 
the problem of German handling of the Jews simmered for 
several months . The Times , the Manchester Guardian, The 
Observer, and The Economist maintained a strong line of 
criticism against Germ�ny, particularly over the Jewish 
issue ,. a.nd, a lthough they maintained an impartial stance,  
the Government rema ined informed on the situation and did 
come under pressure from backbench M . P . ' s  to take a firm 
stance against Germany . On April 1 3 ,  for example ,  Sir Austen 
Chamber lain, in an adjournment debate on foreign policy, 
warned against the new spirit of German nationalism, de-
scribing it as : 
The worst of the All-Prussian Imperialism, with 
an added savagery, a racial pride,  an exclusive­
ness which cannot allow to any fellow-subject not 
of "pure Nordic b i r t h "  equa l ity of rights and citizen­
ship within the nation to which he belongs . 
Europe is menaced and Germany is affl icted by this 
narrow, exclusive , aggressive spirit, where it is a 
3:6 
crime to be in favour of peace and a crime to be 
a Jew. That is not the Germany to which we can 
afford to make concessions . That is not the Germany 
to which Europe can afford to give the equa l it¥. [of 
armaments.I of which the Prime Minister spoke . 3 · 
In  the same debate , Winston Churchill was already prophesying 
war , and two weeks later Lord Grey of Fal loden , Foreign 
Secre tary prior to the First World War ,  addressed the Liberal 
Council and stated that " The great security for peace at 
the present moment is that Germany is not in a position to 
go to war . "  40 
There is a certain paradox in the British attitude 
to Germany in as much as whilst the outcry against what was 
essentially a German internal problem was going on both 
inside and outside Parliament ,  the Government was in the 
middle of trade negotiations with Germany . For some weeks , 
representatives of the German Government had been conferring 
in London over the possibility of a deal involving the Bri-
tish coal industry and it  was announced in Parl iament on 
April 12 that a limited trade agreement had been reached 
between the two countrie s .  For some time , Britain had been 
concerned about the fall of coal imports to the Weser and 
the Elbe , and by this agreement they were to double in 
exchange for a reduction in the import duty on certain arti-
cles in which Germany was interested . When the agreement 
came before the House of ·Commons for discussions , the mood 
of the House was not anti-German but questi�ning of the 
usefulness of the agreement not because it  was with Germany 
but because it was not comprehens ive enough . On May 1 ,  
3 7. 
Sir Austen Chamberlain,  who t hree weeks before had been de-
nouncing Germany ' s  virulent nationalism, asked the government 
to take more time to broaden the scope of the agreement , which 
a t  the time only benefitted the coal indus try . 4 1  Although 
the other speeches in the debate generally endorsed this view, 
the Government ' s  motion was carried and the agreement came 
into effect on May 8 .  
To complicate matters further,  on March 1 8  the Italian 
Government proposed a political agreement between France , 
Germany , Great Britain and Italy, which became known as the 
Four Power Pact .  There can b e  l ittle doubt that Mussolini,  
the head of the Italian Government , was primarily acting on 
behalf of and in the interests of Germany , since the most 
controvers ial clauses of the agreement concerned equality 
of rights in armament . It stated that :  
• • • should the Disarmament Conference only produce 
partial results , the equal ity of rights which has 
been granted to Germany must have practical appli­
cation , and Germany undertakes to achieve such 
equality of rights gradua lly as a result of succes­
s ive agreements arrived at by the Four Powers through 
the normal diplomatic channels . 4 2 
Secondly , it embodied " the principle of the revision of treaties 
of peace in circumstances capable of producing conflict between 
nations . 11 4 3  The Brit ish government was impressed by the 
Italian proposals, which were framed entirel'y within the con-
text of the League of Nations and seemed to provide a safety­
net should the Disarmament Conference in Gerieva fai1 . 4 4  Nego-
tiat ions continued through ilie rest of March and the beginning 
of April , and despite a stormy debate in the House of Commons 
on April 1 3 ,  went on through July . Although the Government 
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was enthusiastic about the Pact,  reaction in the press and 
Parliament were not so favourable . In the debate on April 
1 3 ,  Clement Atlee , the Leader of the Labour Party, demanded 
that "This country should tell Germany that if  she wanted 
revision of the Peace Treaties she must come with clean 
hands . 11 4 5  In the same debate , Sir Austen Chamberlain, in 
his speech (quoted supra) , stated that :  "What is passing 
in Germany seems to me to render this a singularly inoppor-
k b h • • f • I 4 6  tune moment to tal a out t e revision o treaties • . . .  ' 
The press seemed similarly unenthusiastic . In The Times,  
on Saturday , April 2 9 ,  the editor ial  was very firm about 
treaty revision--it stated : 
In point of fact, the view that the Treaty of Versailles 
was an unjust and vindictive instrument was held , out­
s ide Germany, only by comparatively sma l l  groups of 
intellectuals and pacifists of precisely that mentality 
which , inside Germany , the Na zi  movement has violently 
suppressed . Moderate opinion in th is country, at any 
rate , considers that the Peace Treaties were on the 
whole justly and considerately framed,  and that their 
territorial provisions correspond closely to racial 
distribution in Europe . It i s ,  however , realized 
that certain clauses , and in a minor degree some of 
the territorial arrangements , have pressed hardly 
upon the vanquished countries . . . . Some modifica­
tions have already been made . It may be j udged wise 
and equitable to make others . 
The Times , however , asked for an 'unambiguous statement that no 
drastic refashioning of the map of Europe i.s even remotely 
intended . 11 4 7  This cautious line is quite clear : the treaties , 
a lthough containing one or two problems , were essentially fair 
and any major revision--of the kind that Germany might ask for--
should not be made . Despite ·t his opposition, the Government 
remained largely in favour of the proposed Pact, stating that 
it represented "that spirit of mutual cooperation without 
which European recovery would be impossible and the prospect 
of world peace would be jeopardized , 11 4 8  and worked as a kind 
of intermediary ·between the apparently conflicting interests 
of France and Germany . Although the Pact was signed in mid-
July it never received the necessary ratification and, there-
fore , lapsed . 
The early summer months were further confused by two 
other problems--Austro-German �elations and the German demand 
for air power.  The demand for air power occurred after an 
unconfirmed leaf let-drop on Berlin ,  and was fol lowed by ques-
tions in the House of Commons on reports that Germany had 
started to re-equip its Air Forc e ,  a direct infraction of the 
Versailles Treaty . At the time , however, what was to become 
known as the "German Air Menace" did not arouse much comment . 
Before moving on to Austro-Gerrnan relations , which did cause 
some comment in Britain,  it is worth noting that on June 2 an 
article on the whole praising the new spirit of industry and 
t .  1 . d . d . h . 49  n� iona pri e in Germany appeare in t e London Times , and 
that throughout June the correspondence columns of the Times 
seemed to encourage German ambitions in�e Polish corridor . 
Early in June , the tension, which had been growing between 
Austria and Germany since the beginning of the year , increased 
to the point that the Austrian Government sought the inter-
vention of other powers , which ·would have been justifiable 
under the Four Power Pact . 5 0  On Wednesday, June 7 ,  The Times 
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reported: "The policy of Herr H itler towards . Austria is 
one of arrogant interference with the internal Austrian affairs 
by bringing indirect pressure to bear upon the head of her pre-
5 1  sent government . "  Parliament was not sitting at the time, 
so this editorial in The Times was the nearest thing to of-
ficial statement that appeared . In late July and early August , 
however , representations were made through the British Ambas-
sador in Berlin to the German Government concerning both air 
re-armament and Austro-German relations . The Germans indicated 
that they felt the representations concerning Austria were un-
called for interference, and because there was no desire to 
escalate the problem, nothing more could be done; the question 
of air re-armament was moved to the Disarmament Conference in 
Geneva .. 
In Britain , August is a time o� pause , and it was this 
lull in political activity which prompted the German Ambas-
sador to London , Baron von Heesch , to draw up a balance sheet 
of Anglo-German relations which is a good analysis of the state 
of British opinion . He notes that whilst on the one hand , 
there was a general loss of sympathy in socialist,  labour 
union , pacifist , and l iberal circles , on the other hand , a 
certain sympathy had been developed on the right wing of Bri­
tish politics . On the whole ,· howev·er , von Heesch felt that 
in the political arena, Germany had lost a lot of support ,  al­
though public sentiment seemed to favour Germany . He stated 
that the King had become increa·singly hostile  to Germany, but 
that other members of the Royal Family and in particular the 
4 i  
successor to the throne ,· Edward, Prince o f  Wales , were very 
sympathetic , as were other members of the upper-class . On 
the other hand , in ecclesiastical and financial circles , 
1 · . t 52  Th 1 there was a genera anti-German sent1men • e genera 
tenor of the dispatch was that Britain was anti-Germany 
which hampered a general economic agreement which the govern­
ment had wanted to push for . 53 
Despite the generally unfavourable climate of opinion 
in Britain at the time , the Government was still working with 
Germany on the Disarmament Conference in Geneva . The British 
position, however , was an ambiguous and difficult one . Whilst ,  
on the one hand , it was prepared to accept the principle of 
German equality of armaments , �n the other hand it had to be 
receptive to French demands and European security in genera l .  
Therefore , although prepared to make concessions and whilst 
exerting pressure on the French to do the same , Britain did 
e.xpect Germany to meet the other powers half-way . The German 
breaches of the Versailles Treaty , and especially the clauses 
governing air power ,  were of increasing concern to the parti-
cipants of the members of the Disarmament Conference , and the 
mood in September was tense . The conference had adjourned 
in late June because of deadlock over French demands for a 
guarantee of security , and when it reconvened a French proposal 
for a probationary period of international supervision was re-
jected by the Germans .  The crisis was precipitated by the 
announcement by Sir John Simon of British support for the 
French plan . With this announcemerit ,  the German delegates 
4 2  
were recalled to Berl in for discussions, and it  was from 
Berlin that Germany ' s  withdrawal from the Disarmament 
Conference and the League of Nations was announced . Further-
more , a referendum and gen�ral elec'tion concerning the Dis-
armament Conference was to be held in Germany . The attitude 
of the British Government to this news was not entirely pes-
simistic . Sir John Simon wrote to the King : 
It would be reckless to declare that Germany ' s  with­
drawal ( from the Conference and the League) has de­
stroyed a l l  prospects of a Disarmament Convention. 
It would be fool ish to pretend that her withdrawal 
makes no differenc e .  . . • � feefJ that Herr Hitler ' s  
theatrical action in withdrawing from Geneva is an 
attempt to introduce into the international field 
the methods by which he has atta ined power inside 
Germany , and that time must be given to see how 
this works out . Fortunately,  time is available , 
for Germany is at present quite incapable of under­
taking aggression . Europe forewarned is , in a sense 
Europe forearmed . 1154  
This cautious optimism was ,  no doub t ,  due to a communication 
from the new Ambassador to Berlin,  Sir Edward Phipps , in which 
he reported an interview with the German Foreign Minister , 
Baron von Neurath , indicating that Germany was still willing 
. d . . 55  to continue isarmament conversations . 
t d f 1 t d . ' . 56 u e was re ec e in Tne Time s .  
The Government at-
Despite the fact that the elections that were held in 
Germany in November were regarded as so much window dressing , 
d th lt f 1 . 5 7  . f 1 h an ere resu s a oregone cone usion , it was e t t at 
some good may be salvage6 from the situation . On Monday , 
November 1 3 ,  Lord Lothian , in a letter to The Times which 
was endorsed in the editorial that day, asked for an under-
standing of the German point of view, in the hope that some 
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kind of peace and stability in Europe could be established . 
The next day in The Times editorial , after being highly 
critical of the referenda and the internal s ituation in 
Germany , commented that : 
There is no reason to bel ieve that all  the talk during 
the election campa ign about ' peaceful negotiation ' with 
foreign countries was insincere , But it is also clear 
that there is a grim determination in the Na zi mind 
that ,  if German aspirations cannot obtain a diplomatic 
hearing, then military methods will have to be employed 
• 
• 
• . There can be no tranquility or equilibrium in 
Europe so long as a galling sense of inferiority agi­
tates one of its most important states . 58  
Although there is some ambiguity here , there is  definite hope 
as wel l  as an attempt to understand the German point of view. 
This hope was reinforced by two events which fol lowed the 
referenda in November . On November 16 , it was reported that 
negotiations between Germany and Poland began on the subject 
of a non-aggression pact,  and in December the Germans offered 
terms· on disarmamen t .  
There i s  a certain equivqcation i n  the British reaction 
to Germany throughout 1 Q 3 3 . On the one hand , there was a sus­
picion of Germany , largely as a result of the internal 
"revolution" and the excesses which seemed to follow. On 
the other hand, there was the hope that "wh.en the first exu-
berance of the German National Rev·olution has passed, and 
its peculiar form of propagandist genius is no longer given 
undisputed sway, much that is now alarming wil l prove to have 
been froth . 11 59 There was a. considerable amount of criticism 
of G�rmany , but also an attempt to keep Germany in the comity 
of nations . 
1 9.3 3  ended wi.th. much hope that some agreement on dis-
�rmament could be reached, and to thi3 end there was a flurry 
of dispatches between London and the Europe�n Embass ies con-
cerning the proposals made by Hitler himsel f .  The British 
Government had hoped at least to keep communications open by 
using the German proposals of October ,  1933  as a framework , 
and were eager to let Hi.tler know tnat , although a final 
agreement had to be subject to debate among all the powers ,  
th · f b · f a ·  · 1 ere was ,  in act, a asis or 1scuss1on. These hopes of 
an early settlement of the disarmament question with which 
1933  ended, however , were dashed early in January , 1 9 3 4 ,  when 
the French rej ected the German proposals for a disarmament 
schedule . Despite this set-back, talks continued and a 
"Memorandum on Disarmament11 2 was drawn up by the British 
Foreign Office . Although its general tenor was firm , it re-
iterated the concept of equality of rights and clearly stated 
that "the situation must be reached in which arms of a kind 
permitted to one State cannot continue to be denied another . 11 3 
The agreement that was reached between Germany and 
Poland late in January was a reassuring event .  The German-
Polish Non-Aggress ion Pact which was signed on January 2 6  and 
was to last for ten years was greated with delight both inside 
d · a  ,... . 4 an outs1 e uovernment circle s .  On January 3 0 ,  The Times 
editorialized : 
4 4  
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. • • considering the violence of the propaganda 
carried out by the National Socialists condemning 
the existence of the [Polish] corridor , the Ten­
Year Pact is a signal proof of the moderation which 
Herr Hitler knows how to use when he likes ,  and the 
readiness of his countrymen to fol low his lead . s 
The editorial appeared on the first anniversary of the Hitler 
regime and went on to say : 
As the naturally strong prejudices against the 
brutality of his earlier methods subsides ,  and 
j udgement of Germany again becomes unbiased, it is 
generally recognized that Herr Hitler ' s  fundamental 
aim is to restore Germans ' belief in themselves an� 
to make Germany respected--perhaps feared--abroad. 
Hitler chose the first anniversary of his regime to 
address the Reichstag , giving a summary of events which led up 
tq the formation of his Government and its achievements over 
the previous year . When dealing with foreign policy , Hitler 
maintained that equality of r±ghts was the only way to obtain 
peac e ,  but was at pains to point out his peaceful intentions 
in the resolution of all political and economic differences . 
The Times , commentin9 favourably on the speech , stated : "It  
is  clear that Herr Hitler can pursue a policy of  internal re-
form and external conciliation with greater freedom and with 
greater power than was possible to any of his predecessors 
in office. 11 7 On the same day, however , Sir Eric Phipps , the 
British Ambassador to Berlin, sent a lengthy review of German 
foreign policy aims wh ich was of a very different tenor . In 
commenting on the Hitler Government,  he stated that they were 
men : 
• • •  whose ultimate aims are mu�h the same �s those 
of Weimar] , but whose radica lly  different methods 
may at some future date precipitate international 
4 6  
conflict. . For Nazi  Germany believes neither in the 
League (9f NationSJ nor in negotiation , and claims 
with some justice that the experience of the last 
fourteen years has converted the vast mass of the 
German nation , and particulargy the younger genera­
tion , to their i?"QTnt of view .. 
The telegram goes on to state that although the general aims 
of German foreign pol icy , that i s  fusion with Austria , recti-
fication of frontiers , and the recovery of some colonial ter-
ritories ,  had not changed, the methods by which they could 
be achieved had . One problem that seemed pivotal to Phipps 
was the rea_cquisition of the Saar,  which was still in French 
hand s .  Until such time as the Saar question was resolved 
tQ the advantage of Germany , Hi_tler , it seemed to Phipps , was 
likely to show some moderation--after that he could be more 
a_dv·enturous . The communication ends with this warning : 
13 . Whilst it may be said that a Nationalist 
Germany will not be deterred in the long run from 
pursuing her policy by mere consideration that it 
may lead to war ,  for the moment she desires peace ,  
for the reason that she is not prepared for war . •  
But she demands equality of armaments as a right.  
Later , she will presumably demand territorial revision 
of the 'unjust ' peace treaties also as a right,  and will 
hope to secure these des iderata by peaceful means. • 
If  these metnods fail and the ' just ' claims of Germany 
should lead to war , the blame will be laid on her 
enemies . . . . 
This di_spatch , which was also seen by the Prime Minister, 
was called by Sir John Simon, "a  most il luminating document--
d ' f  . 10 an terri ying . Since this document wou ld not have been 
seen outside Government circles , there was no further comment 
on i t  .. 
The concern expressed by Phipps was already being 
voiced by ogher s .  On February 7 ,  Winston Churchill made a 
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speech in the House of Commons on the per.ils  of neglecting 
defence , particularly air defence . Sta ting th.at,  "We are 
vulnerable as we have never been before " ,  Churchill painted 
a very vivid picture of the destruction that could be wrought 
by bombs falling on London. 11 Furthermore, he is quite ex-
plicit in viewing Germany as the thread to world peace . 
In late February and early March , Anthony Eden , Lord 
Privy Sea l ,  embarked upon a tour of the capitals of France , 
Germany , and Italy in order to try to further disarmament 
negotiations . There was no real progress made toward a dis-
armament agreement , but it  did become clear that Germany 
was rearming toward her goal of equality of armaments . In 
commenting upon this , The Times maintained that although this 
was ,  in fact ,  contrary to the Versa illes Treaty , "How indeed 
can a country properly be denied the. means to defend itself . 11 1 2  
This attitude, which was to become more widely shared (see 
infra) was entirely consistent with the hope that Germany 
could be returned , as a responsible member, to. the community 
of Nations ( see supra ) , but ignored the misgivings a lready 
being voiced in some quarters . 
On March � '  Churchill made another speech in the House 
of Commons on air power . In it he stated his opinion : 
Germany is ruled by a handful of autocrats .  • . • They 
are men who have neither the long interests of a dynasty 
to consider , nor those very important restraints which 
a democratic Parl iament and constitutional system im­
pose upon any executive Government . .  � • 
I dread the day when the means @ir power] of 
threatening the heart of the British Empire should 
pass into the hands of the present rulers of Germany . . . 
. 
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. Germany i s  arming . . . .  and no one will 
stop her . • . . The spirit of aggressive nationalism 
was never more r ife in Europe and in the world. 13  
The sentiments of this speech were reiter'ated a week later ! on 
March 1 4 ,  but did not gain any widespread support .  In fact ,  
in  an  editorial on March 2 3 ,  The· Times criticised the F.rench 
Government for blocking an agreement on disarmament. 1 4  
Whilst Churchill was prophesying German bell igerence,  
the Cabinet met to discuss the potential threat that Germany 
posed . Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for India,  
felt that Germany was not as  great a threat to security as  
was recently suggested but feared a recurrence of  the s ituation 
immediately prior to the First World War when everyqne was 
preparing for war with Germany and that inevitably had led 
to war. Sir John S imon felt that Germany was not threatening 
or aggressive toward Britain but could become so, although 
he felt that the threat to peace was more l ikely in Eastern 
Europe . Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer , 
felt that some means other than massive defence spending should 
be sought to offset any potential threat . The general conclu-
sion of the meeting was that, if the disarmament discussions 
were to fai l ,  Germany could become a potential threat to 
others .  In those circumstances ,  the Cabinet should consider 
two possible alternatives : first, to reach some kind of se-
curity agreements to provide against a breach of the peace; 
secondly ,  to face heavy defence expend iture although it may 
turn out that these wou ld not be exclusive alternatives or 
the only alternatives . 15 This drawing of positions seems 
prescient of future events . 
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On March. 2 8  , . the German Go.verrunen.t .announced a s izable 
increase in expenditure of the· A.rmy , Navy , and Air Ministries . 
On the following Saturday , March 3 1 ,  The Times discussed this 
increase, not in terms of the possible threat to national se-
curity , but in reference to the claim that Germany was unable 
to pay foreign debts�  It was the economic problems , not se-
curity , that were of more concern at this time� The reaction 
of the Goverrunent was somewhat different,  however ,  a.nd concern 
was also expressed in questions in the House of Commons . It 
would s·eem that the answer made by the German Government set 
the British minds at re.st, at least temporarily . 16 Early 
in April ,  however , Sir Robert Vansittart wrote a paper in 
support of the Defence Requirements Committee which envisaged 
17  Germany as  "the ultimate potential enemy . "  He  adds : 
There is probably no immediate danger . As the 
Defence Requirements Committee puts it :  'We have 
time , though not too much time , to make defensive 
preparations ' • . . .  The Germans are too competent, 
and matters are now moving too fas t ,  to make a long 
estimate a safe one .  One thing admits no query : 
the proclaimed ends of the present Naz i  Government can 
only be realised as the result of great sacrifices of1 or on the part of ,  other Powers , including ourselves . 8 
Later in Apri l ,  the King had an interview with the German Am-
bassador , von Hoesch,  which was recorded by his Private Secre-
tary , Sir Clive Wigram . He said that :  
at  the present moment ,  Germany was the peril 
of the world , and that ,  if she went on at the pre-
sent rate , there was bound to be a war within ten 
years . The King asked what Germany was arming for? 
No one wanted to attack her , but she was forcing a l l  
the other countries to be prepared for an attack on 
her part .  The Ambassador tried to excuse Germany by 
saying that the French fortificat ions were impregna­
ble and that Germany had no fortifications on her side . 
�o 
His Majesty ridiculed this idea, and said that in 
the last war fortifications . were useless and would 
be even· more so in the next. 19  
The next event that elicited a response from Britain 
was the suppression of a potential coup and a purging of 
certain enemies or suspected enemies of the Nazi  regime on 
June 30 . The statement by Ghring for the German Government 
maintained that a c lique of S . A .  leaders who wished to start 
a second revolution were detected and suppressed rather bru-
tally . At least seventy-seven people lost their lives , in-
eluding an ex-Chancellor of the Reich . The British Government 
refrained from comment s ince this was largely an internal pro-
blem. The 'Time s ,  ho.wever , decr.;i.ed the medieval methods : 
What is ominously symptomatic of the present state of 
Germany is the savagery, the disregard for all forms 
of law wh ich are the indispensible safeguards of jus­
tice and which are sacrosanct in every modern c ivilised 
state . 20 
It should be remembered that tbe purging of the Nazi regime was 
largely an internal matter and , therefore , was largely open 
to private comment only . The concept of the brutal nature 
of the Nazi Government, which earlier in 1934  had been fading 
( see supra ) , re-emerged , but there was no international threat 
posed by the event .  
The German attitude toward Austria , a problem that had 
been simmering for a time , came to the fore aga:in in July , and 
was the next question which concerned the British Government ,  
as well as those of France and Italy . The propaganda campaign , 
which the Nazis had been carrying out in Austria to try to 
s·1 
force or at least precipitate some kind of Austro-German 
unification, had caused much. concern in Britain and caused 
Sir John Simon to state in the House of Commons that "the 
independence and safety of Austria are an essential to which 
British policy is directed . 11 21  In February, 1 9 3 4 ,  the British,  
French, and Italian Governments jointly announced the common 
view of the necess ity of maintaining Austrian independence . 
It i s ,  however , quite clear that by March , the German Govern-
ment was taking a different approach to the Austrian question, 
preferring to build up the strength ·of the Nazi Party within 
Austria rather than trying to precipitate a solution by force 
2 2  or propaganda . When , a s  part of a Putsch by the Austrian 
Nazi Party , the Austrian leader Dr. Dol lfuss , was murdered , 
Hitler did not attempt to intervene . The murder was condemned 
in Britain and in September , the British , French and Italian 
GoveFnments reaffirmed their declaration of the previous 
February, but The Times maintained : 
It would be unfa ir , in the light of present infor­
mation , to attribute to the German Government the 
responsibility for yesterday ' s  reckless adventure ; 
but unquest ionably the revolt owes something to the 
persistent instigation that has come from Germany . 23 
This seems to be a representative view . 
In the last five months of 193 4 ,  there was no real in-
cident . Winston Churchill  made several speeches on air power 
and the German air menace , but his was largely a lone voice .  
On November 28 ,  however ,  Stanley Baldwin, as Lord President of 
the Council , addressed the House of Commons for the Government 
in a debate on National defence .· In his address , Baldwin main-
tained: 
. the malaise today in Europe is not only fear , 
but ignorance outside of Germany and secrecy inside. 
Situated where Germany is , she is more dependent 
than most of us on friendship and on trading with her 
neighbours . . May the opportunity come before long 
when she will tear this veil of secrecy away and bring 
to light the things that are alarming Europe , and we 
may discuss them and see what,  even now, may be done . 2 4  
There are mixed feelings voiced -here . On the one hand , there 
is an apprehension of what may be happening in Germany ; on 
the other, a wil lingness to discuss any problems , · particularly 
trade , which may be confronting Germany . There a lso seems to 
be an attempt to allay alarmist fear s .  The next day , The Times 
editorialized : 
No doubt from the German point of view, the necessary 
preliminary to this re-entry into the community of 
nations is the recognition of German equality in some 
practical manner . It is deplorable �hat Germany should 
be �etting herself to gain it by a violation of the 
Treaty of Versail les . But it would not be fair to put 
the whole respons ibil ity for that upon her shoulders . 25  
These vie�s were s imilar to those expressed throughout the pre-
vious day ' s  debate . 
The year 1934 , rather than being one of great action in 
Anglo-German relations � was one of solidification of views . 
Two groups can be seen to be forming� On the one hand , there 
was an attempt to accommodate Germany within the international 
community ; on the other, there was an attempt to forewarn the 
Government of the danger of a violently nationalistic Germany . 
IV 
It is di�f icult to avoid treating inte�national rela-
tions separately from events in other fields . When dealing 
with a specialized topic , such as Anglo-German relations , it 
is even harder to conceive of any other events impinging upon 
that subjec t .  The consideration of the Government of India 
Bill took up much of Parliament ' s  time early in 1�35 , as did 
many other domestic matters , and Anglo-German relations must 
take their place within that framework . 
In January , 1 9 3 5 ,  the Foreign Secreta�y , Sir John Simon, 
wrote to the King expressing some optimism fo� an improvement 
in European relations and outlining the Government ' s  position . 
He wrote : 
The point which Sir John as been pressing is  that the 
practical choice is between a Germany which continues 
to re-arm without any regulation or agreement , and a ·  
Germany which , through getting a recognition of its 
rights and some modifications of the Peace Treaties , 
enters into the comity of nations , and contributes , 
in this and other ways , to European stabil ity . As 
between these two courses ,  there can be no doubt 
which is the wiser . I 
Two days later,  the King ' s  Private Secretary , Lord Wigram, wrote 
to the British Ambassador in Berlin in a less optimistic frame 
of mind . In his letter, he wrote that :  "His Majesty fee ls 
that we must not be blinded by the apparent sweet reasonableness 
2 of the Germans , but be wary and not be taken unawares . "  The 
King ' s  position precluded making public statements on foreign 
policy and , therefore , the Government ' s  view held sway . 
53  
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The first problem to arise in 1935  was the status 
of the Saar region . Under the Treaty of Versailles , the 
mines of the Saar were ceded to France , and an International 
Conunission was set up to administer the territory . In addi-
tion , provision was made for a plebiscite in order that inhabi-
tants of the region could choose to maintain the existing sys-
tern, unite with France, or unite �ith Germany . The plebiscite 
was scheduled to take place on January 1 3 ,  1935 . The voting 
went off peacefully and the results were announced on January 
15 with an overwhelming 9 0 %  in favour of re-unification with 
Germany . The following day , The Times editorial ized : 
In any case the Saar vote has been fairly and freely 
taken : and the reunited province wil l be as prepon­
derantly Nazi as the rest of Germany • •  � 
• 
For them, 
as for the majority in the Reich , Herr Hitler is Germany; 
and it is a sentiment which the world outside wi ll be 
wise to accept . The result of the Saar vote should 
further strengthen the position of the Leader ; it may 
also maka ij easier for him to pursue his policy of 
moderation . 
The territory was ceded to Germany on March 1 .  
On March 4 ,  the Government issued a White Paper on de-
fence which outlined plans for an increase in all  areas of de-
fence spending , �ermany being named as one of the causes for 
this increas e .  Because of the White Paper, a proposed visit by 
Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden to Berlin was postponed by 
Hitler until March 2 5  because he had ' caught a cold ' .  The 
White Paper was debated in Parliament on the following Monday ,  
March 1 1 ,  and The Times carried a long editorial concerning i t .  
Maintaining that the increased spending was to bring the British 
armed fore es up to date and establish ·an equa lity of armaments in 
Europe , The Times went on to say :  
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The essential and immediate requirement �or the sta­
bilisation of Europe is in fact the equal ·participa­
tion of Germany. _ • . I f  it is the intention of the 
British Government to get Part V of the· Versailles 
Treaty superseded by a system in which all  are equal , 
then no purpose is served by harping on a breach of the 
Treaty--a breach,  moreover , for which it is unfair to 
blame Germany alone . The principle of equal ity has 
been accepted . That equal ity is being gradual ly at­
tained . Its final attainment will probably afford the 
last chance of e stablishing a .general system for the 
limitation of armaments � . . . The decision has been 
taken to treat Germany as an equal .  That policy must 
be carried out single mindedly . 4 
It is  also interesting to note that the announcement in Berlin  
of the actual existence of  a German Air Force , a fact that had 
never been officially admitted , caused no comment in The Times . 
On March 1 5 ,  the French Chamber of Deputies voted to 
extend compulsory military service by two years and using 
this as a pretext, on Saturday, March 1 6 ,  H itler announced the 
reintroduction of conscription in Germany and renounced Part V 
of the Treaty of Versai lles , which dealt with the question of 
armaments , This caused a flurry of activity in London and 
ministers returned to London for hurriedly cal led meetings . 
On March 1 8 ,  The Times denounced th is flagrant breach of the 
Treaty of Versail les which seems to contradict what it pad 
printed the previous week { see supra) , but went on to say , 
in a more conci l iatory ton e :  
I f  Herr H itler ' s  move i s  simply a rather crude 
method of assertingGerman equa l ity , then no ir­
reparable harm has been done . The negotiat ions 
can go forward , The visit should be paid to Berlin 
according to plan� • . . But it becomes of more ur­
gent importance than ever to know from Her� Hitler 
h imse lf  whether Germany intends , sincerely and whole­
heartedly , to play her part in that system, and to join 
with others in an equitable plan for the general l imi­
tation of armaments . 5 
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Other influential papers like the News Chronicle ,  the Da ily 
Mirror , and the Daily Express were more understanding , and 
the Labour Party paper,  the Daily Herald,  wen·t so far as to 
say that Hitler ' s  declaration constituted an invitation to 
1 d .  6 genera 1 sarmament . The Government was not so optimistic , 
and Sir John Simon wrote to the King : 
There may be a certain advantage in  the German Govern­
ment having come out into the open . But it is Sir 
John ' s  view that the German Government do not really 
want to make an agreement or at least only wish to do 
so on German terms which would be intolerable for 
others . It must not be assumed that the present de­
mands for conscription and a large army is the end 
of the lis t :  on the contrary , the demilitarized zone , 
the navy , Memel ,  Danzig .  and the former German colonies , 
may be expected to be in the ultimate German programme . 
But Sir John feels that there is  no advantage in re­
fusing to go to Berlin , sma ll though the prospects are 
Qf any positive resu l t s . 7 
The visit of Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden to Berlin 
went ahead as planned despite the previous diplomatic insult 
of Hitler ' s  cold and the announcement on March 1 6 .  The reason 
for the meetings was to discuss the possibil ity of an Eastern 
Locarno , proposals for which had been mooted in 1 9 3 4 , and the 
question of Germany ' s  return to the League of Nations . Nothing 
definite was really accomplished by the talks and a disheartened 
Simon wrote in his diary : 
The practical result of our Berl in visit is to establish 
that Germany greatly desires a good understanding with 
Brita i n ,  but that she is  determined to go her own way 
in  rearmament ; that she expects in time to get all Ger­
many within her borders , including Austria , that she 
does not fear isoJation and has no intenti�n of joining 
in collec t ive security ; and that she wants the ex-German 
colonies back before returning to the League of Nations . 
All th is is pretty hopeles s :  for if Germany will not 
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co-operate for confirming the solidarity o f  Europe , 
the rest · of Europe ought to co-operate ·to preserve 
it in spite o� Germany . This may not prevent an 
ultimate explosion , but it will delay it . 8 
A more optimistic view was put forward in The ·Times on April 4 ,  
and since both at home and abroad it was seen largely as a 
Government organ (see supra) it is· worth quoting at  some length . 
Germany. . . • has perhaps been somewhat hastily 
condemned in authoritative quarters as an enemy of 
the whole collective system because she also objects 
to the proposed Eastern Security Pac t .  I t  is known 
that Herr Hitler is ready to have pacts of non-ag­
gression with every neighbour of Germany--except 
Lithuania , because of special difficulties in Memel ; 
and he .is also ready • • •  to agree that all the separate 
pacts should be united in a general Convention . 
It  may not be a whole col lective system. But it cer­
tainly does not conflict with it ;  and it should form 
a possible basis on which this country can still at 
this moment pursue its object of organizing peac e .  
There i s  need for education a t  this moment , for i t  
is clear that far too much stress has been laid on the 
negative side of Herr Hitler ' s  statements to Sir John 
Simon, and that far too little attempt has been made to 
fix attention on their positive s ide.  It is a matter 
of common knowledge now that Herr Hitler arrived some 
time ago at a f igure which in his view German armed 
strength ought to reach in relation to the present 
strength of his neighbours � but the Berl in conversa- . 
tions seemed to have made it clear that he is also 
willing , having disclosed h is figure , to discuss with 
them a proportionate all round reduction . 9 
This editorial is even more surprising in the light of the edi-
torial on March 18 ( see supra) , however , it did set a tone for 
wider reactions . 
Shortly after The Times editorial appeared , representa-
tives of Britain , France and Italy meet at Stressa,  from April 
1 1  to 1 4 ,  to discuss Germany ' s  rearmament and the further pos­
s ibil ity of an Eastern Security Pact�  Again, there was no 
positive result from the Conference--approval of an Eastern 
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Pact was reaffirmed and Ge.rII\any was cr.iticized for the breaches 
of Versaille s ,  but no definite ·action was taken. Approaches 
were made from Stressa to Germany to try to get some further 
p�ogress of the Eastern Pact but everything was at the level 
of conversations . On April 1 5 ,  The Times published a very 
pro-German editorial which completed the about-face from March 
1 8 ,  In i t ,  the editor stated: 
.Germany hersel f  was promised equality in 1 9 3 2 ,  
and i f  the concealment so long officially maintained 
by the 'German Government in regard to rearmament was 
reprehensible ,  what other method is in practice pos­
sible to an advanced country to· whom parity has been 
promised? lO 
The Times , thus , completely vindicates Hit ler ' s  actions and 
German ' s  position . 
Whilst the meeting was taking place at Stressa,  the 
Prince of Wales had a long conversation with the German Ambas-
s ador in London in which he clearly showed his sympathy for 
the regime in Berlin .  When asked i f  he  had misgivings about 
the reintroduction of conscription in Germany, the Prince re-
plied that he "took it as a matter of course that Germany had 
not wished permanently to remain in a s tate of unilateral 
disarmament and he had long foreseen that ,  if there was no 
general disarmament, Germany would one day take it upon her­
self  to decide the scale of her armaments . 11 11  At the end of 
the conversation , the Prince assured the Ambassador , "once 
more of his deep sympathy for the wishes of the great German 
people and by expressing the hope that solutions might be 
found which would be acceptable to Germany and which wou ld ,  
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. 12 therefore, contribute 't.o safeguarding world peace .. " The 
Pr�nce made his feelings public a month ·1ater when h� addressed 
the British Legion in London , saying : 
I feel that there is no more suitable body or organisa­
tion of men to stretch forth the hand of friendship to 
the Germans than we ex-Servicemen who fought them in3 the Great War and have now· forgotten all about that . 1 
This prominent , and public stance by a member of the Royal 
Family is unusua l ,  but these views expressed by the heir-apparent 
to the throne were those held by his social set , and were common 
1 4  to one segment o f  the British upper-classes � 
Shortly after the Stressa Conference ,  the question of 
a naval agreement came to the for e .  In January , 1935 , two 
private visits were made to Berlin . The first was made by 
Clifford Allen, a friend and conf idante of the Prime Minister , 
Ramsey MacDonald ; and the second was by Philip Kerr , an influ-
ential Conservative . Both had meetings with Hitler , and at 
both meetings , the possibil ity of a naval agreement between 
Britain and Germany was discussed . Kerr mentioned the possi-
bility of an agreement to Baldwin and to S imon , and for the 
next few weeks worked as an intermediary between London and 
Berlin.  By May , the groundwork for negotiations was laid , and 
as an addit ional incentive , Berlin submitted plans for an air 
pact to the British Government at the end of that month . Talks 
started in London on June 4 and encountered difficulties im-
mediately , al though The Times gave an encouraging editorial 
for the opening day of the talks � It stated : 
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Wha_tever differences of views may existt . it  is alto­
gether desirable that they be brought ·into the open, . 
· for the greatest enemy of understanding is secrecy • •  
and no� at last there appears to be a possibility of 
reconciling what has sometimes seemed a conflict of 
irreconcilable c laims for equality and security � lS 
. . 
The Germans wanted to settle on a ratio of 3 5  per cent of Bri-
ti sh naval tonnage from the outset , whilst th.e British ·wanted 
no such restrictions on negotiations . This impasse could have 
posed problems to a final agreement, but the next day the Bri­
tish agreed to the 3 5  per cent principl e ,  and by June 6 the 
treaty was almost ready. On June 7 ,  there was a reorganization 
of the British Government in which Stanley Baldwin became 
Prime Minister and Sir Samuel Hoare replaced Simon as Foreign 
Secretary ( Simon was moved to the Home Office ) , but Hoare was 
no less eager to conclude an agreement , and the Anglo-German 
Naval Treaty was finalized in the form of an exchange of notes , 
on June 1 8 .  On June 1 4 ,  �he Times began to prepare public 
opinion for the ensuing agreement with a long editorial . In 
it it was stated : 
The attempt to obtain an all-embracing arms agree­
ment between sixty nations at Geneva having failed, 
the British Government have wisely determined to 
advance step by step. The naval agreement is one . 
The Air Locarno should be the next • . . •  
In its broadest aspects . . .  there is not the 
s lightest doubt that the agreement if it comes will  
be generally welcomed in this country. . . • Although 
in practice it involves a tacit disregard of the Treaty 
of Versailles , yet, inasmuch as it will substitute a 
new agreement for a section of the disarmament c lause 
of the Treaty, it wi l l  constitute an important advance 
in the process of getting peace established upon the 
firm ground of agreements freely concluded. . . . 
Herr Hitler believes in the renaissance of the Wes t .  
Here is a field for a nobler more constructive activity 
than exclusiv5 concentration on negative plans for pre­
venting war .. l 
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The broad agreement was that German naval tonnage was fixed 
at 35 per cent of the British ; and submarine tonnage at 4 5  
per cent . The reaction to the Treaty was almost universally 
favourable except for spokesmen like Winston Churchi l l  and 
Austen Chamberlain. In a speech in the House of Commons ,  on 
July 11 when the Treaty came up for debate , Churchi l l  asserted : 
We have condoned this unilateral violation of the Treaty [9f Versai lles"], and we have become a party to i t  with­
out agreement with any of the other countries concerned. 
We have, however unintentiona lly ,  nullified and stulti­
fied the. League of Nations ' condemnation of treaty 
breaking • . •  in which . • •  we took a leading part .  
During the last s ix weeks , the League of  Nations 
has been weakened by our action , the principle of 
collective security has been impaired� • , 
I cannot feel that this German Naval Agreement is 
at all a matter for rejoicing � I remain still  under 
this impression , that the one great fear of Europe is 
the power and might of the rearmed s trength of Germany , 
and that the one great hope is the gathering together 
of power s.  . . in order that this tremendous process 
of the rearmament of Germany may not be attended by 
some lamentable breakdown of peace � l7 
In his autobiography , Sir Samuel Hoare recorded a conversation 
explaining the position ot the Government by saying that there 
was no question of "placating Hitler . Seein9 , however ,  Hitler ' s  
growing strength . we were forced to play for time . 
The alternatives were either drift or preventive war . No one 
in Great Britain was prepared to go to war with Germany in 
order to stop German rearmament • . .  The alternative of 
drift had let him build up an army as strong as France and an 
1 8  air force a s  strong as ours . "  Despite adverse criticism 
by people like Churchil l ,  then, it was hoped that the very 
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process of a series of agreements of this kind would main­
tain peace in Eu�ope. 
Discussions about th� possibility of an "Air Locarno" 
continued throughout the rest of the year but no real advance 
was made toward an agreement . Furthermore , the Abyssinian 
crisis came to the fore in the second half of 1 9 3 5 ,  when the 
Italians invaded Abyssinia . Thus , with the triumph of the 
Naval Agreement, Anglo-German relations maintained an even 
keel throughout the rest of the year� 
v 
The calm and friendly atmosphere in Anglo-German 
relations , with which 1 9 3 5  ended , cooled somewhat in 1 9 3 6 .  
This was partly due to the fact that Germany suspended talks 
on an Air Locarno because of the Franco-Soviet Pact which 
was signed in May, 1 9 3 5 .  There was a sudden unfavourable 
reaction to Germany in the British press which Germans noted . 1 
It  was also a period of turmoil in Britain .  The ill-fated 
attempt to solve the Abyssinian Crisis by the Hoare-Laval 
plan of 1935 , had caused the resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare 
as Foreign Secretary and the appointment of Anthony Eden to 
replace him. In addition , the death of George V ,  in January , 
1 9 3 6 ,  caused some �ncertainty . 
There was an air of anticipation and uncertainty with 
the accession of Edward VIII , the Germans were aware of the 
new King • s  pro-German sympathies , and late in January were 
informed , by their Ambassador to the United States , of a 
conversation between the then Prince of Wales , and an  American 
j ournalis t .  I n  the course of the conversation , the new King 
expressed his disapproval of close links with France and de­
clared a "sympathy for Ge_rmany ' s  difficult position . 11 2 Fur­
theremore ,  the new King did not believe it was· his duty to 
follow his Cabinet ' s  decisions blindly, but to intervene if 
Government plans were , in his view, detrimental to British 
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interests . In  a further conversation, rec'orded in an unsigned 
Memorandum to the German Foreign Ministry � 3 Edward VIII  main-
tained that an urgent nec·ess.i ty was an alliance between Germany 
and Britain ,  including France . He asserted , furthermore , that 
the League of Nations was a farce .· The Memorandum also inc luded 
conversations with other prominent Eng lishment , including Eden , 
the Foreign Secretary ; Lord Mansel l ,  First Lord of the Admiralty; 
Duff Cooper , the Minister of War ;  Neville Chamberlain , the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer ; and the Editor of The· Time s .  All of 
these people ,  both ·in and out of the Cabinet , were in favour 
of an a l liance with Germany which ·i ncluded France, but were 
particularly interested in closer relations between Britain 
and Germany " 
On January 2 ,  The Times cal led for an increase in 
d f d .  4 e ence expen iture . The reasons for this call are complex--
there was still a crisis in Abyssinia; problems in the Far 
Eas t ;  as well as European tension . As a world power , Britain 
had to be prepared to face conflicts wherever they occurred 
in the world , and The Times felt that this must inevitably 
call for an . increase in defence expenditure . A week later , 
as reported in The Times , it was f�ared that the economic 
sanctions levied against Italy might be broken by the German 
Government . Then , on January 1 7 ,  Dr.  Goebbels made a speech 
in which he stated that:  
Some people say that there is a world conscience 
which is in the League of Nations , whose part is 
to preserve the peace of the world,  but I prefer to 
rely on guns . 5 
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This statement caused much concern in Britain , and The Times 
editorialized on the subject ,  saying that the speech was 
• • .deliberately designed to check the growth of 
any sympathy for Germany in other countries , and 
which is hard to reconcile with the pacific pro­
fessions of the more responsible leaders of the 
new Germany . 6 
In addition to these events , there was concern over the Free 
City of Danzig, and German aspirations in that direction . It 
was this configuration of factors--real and/or imagined--which 
provoked some suspicion of Germany in the British press .  It  
was under these circumstances that Prince von Bismarck, a 
Counsellor at the London Embassy , reported a conversation 
with a member of the Foreign Office . In the. course of that 
conversation , it was state.a that the Government was aware 
of this atmosphere and that " the Foreign Office and the Cabinet 
was pursuing . • •  ( a  policy) of cooperation as far as possible 
7 with Germany . "  
On February 1 3 ,  Harold Nicolson , a Member Qf Parliament 
and diplomatist ,  recorded in his diary a conversation with Eden 
in which the Foreign Secretary stated that his chief concern 
was to avert a war with Germany . To that end he was quite 
prepared to make large concessions to Germany on the proviso 
that Germany sign a disarmament treaty and join the League 
of Nations , 8 Shortly afterwards , Tom Jones , a leading member 
of the Conservative Party , wrote to a friend : 
I keep on and on and on preaching against the policy 
of ostracizing Germany , however incalcu lab le Hitler 
and his crew may be , and the duty of resisting Vansittart ' s  
pro-French bias . . • .  We have abundant evidence of the 
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desire of all sorts of Germans to be on friendly 
te�ms with us . . •  the moral . • •  · . is to put as 
much energy into a new economic policy for Europe 
as we are now putting into rearmament � 9 
By the end of February, the dominant view was that the Govern­
ment ought at least to attempt a rapprochement with Germany . 
On February 2 7 ,  the French Parliament ratified the 
Franco-Soviet Security Pact , which had been s igned in May , 1 9 3 5 .  
on March 5 ,  a copy of a memorandum was sent to the German 
Ambassadors in Britain , France , Italy , and Belgium. With it 
were instructions to deliver it to the Foreign Secretary of 
the respective countries on Saturday morning, March 7 .  The 
memorandum stated that ,  because of the violation of the Locarno 
Treaty by France--inasmuch as the Pact with Russia was ratified--
Germany was reoccupying the Rhineland as of that day , March 7 .  
Until that time , the Rh.ineland had been a demilitarized zone 
under the provisions of the Versailles Treaty . The memorandum 
further stated that now that Germany had regained full sever-
eignty over all its territory , it was prepared to rejoin· the 
League of Nation s .  I n  addition , there was a seven-point 
peace plan .  This act was not only contrary to the so-called 
diktat of Versail les , but also the Locarno Pact , which was 
a freely negotiated agreement which Hitler had endorsed in 
1933  and 19 34 . 
The first reaction was that of the Foreign Secretary , 
Anthony Eden , who received the German memorandum on March 7 .  
In his memoirs,  Eden states that he 
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. • • deeply regretted the information which he 
(J:he Ambassador\ had gi_ven me about the ·action the 
German Government was taking in the demilitarized 
zone. The Arnbass·ad0r would understand that this 
amounted to the unilateral repudiation of a treaty 
freely negotiated and freely signed . • . • Von 
Hoesch repeated that the Franco-Russian Pact had 
. • •  violated Locarno , but I answered that this 
view was not shared by other s ignators of that 
Treaty. 
Eden went on to say he felt that the German offers in the last 
part of the memorandum were most important and that the Bri-
tish Government would consider them carefully� The German 
Ambassador ., s account of the meeting was sl ightly different , 
inasmuch as when he pointed out to Eden that the French had 
broken Locarno by Article 1 of the Protocol accompanying the 
Franco-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, Eden did not defend the 
c lause but suggested that the correct procedure would have 
b 1 f b .  t . 1 2  h . 1 .  h 1 een to appea to a court o ar 1tra ion . T i s  s 1g t y 
different emphasis changes the tone of the meeting , and al-
though in neither account can Eden ' s  attitude be called con-
cil iatory , it does seem a little more understanding in the 
German account . This understanding is borne out by later 
Cabinet documents [see infra) . 
The next reaction came in Tom Jones ' diary entry for 
March. 8 .  On the weekend of the reoccupation of the Rhineland , 
Torn Jones was at a house party with several influential people,  
including Pnilip Kerr ( Lord Lothian) . The group was informed 
of the German moves and discussed them .at some length . They 
welcomed Hit ler ' s  decision and re�arded the breach of Versailles 
de minimii.s since that treaty was already dead .  Al though they 
condemned the entry of troops into th.e dem.ilitarized zone , 
it was felt an act of equality and not aggress·ion ,. Finally, 
whilst accepting Hitler ' s  �eace plan on good faith, it was 
felt that rearmament should continue . 10  
By Monday , March 9 ,  the pre�s reacted to events of 
the weekend. The Times editorial that morning stated : 
Herr Hitler ' s  invasion of the Rhineland is a 
challenge • •  � to the voluntary agreement which has 
maintained the inviolability of the eastern borders 
of France and Belgium for the last eleven years • .  � . 
The Locarno Agreement was in some ways ahead of its 
time � � . • It embodied the clauses of the Versailles 
Treaty which imposed demi litarization upon the German 
s·ide only of the Franco-German frontier . Thus , having 
failed as the starting point of a process of appease­
ment, it survived only , in German eyes , as an addi­
tional guarantee of one of the ' inequalities ' in 
which the Nazi movement of resurgence and revolt 
had its birth � • • •  
Herr Hitler h�s endeavoured to give to his 
defaul t ,  flagrant and indefensible in itsel f ,  a con­
structive political implication • .  
The old structure of European peace ,  one-sided 
and unbalanced , is nearly in ruins . It  is the 
moment, not to despair , but to rebuild . 13 
'rhe Daily Mirror carried the banner headline , " It  must not 
be war , " and went on in its leader to say :  
Germany has flung a challenge to Europe that can lead 
to another great war - or a strong and lasting peace . 
IT MUST NOT LEAD TO WAR . . Serious as this vio-
lation of the Locarno Pact (which Germany signed 
voluntarily) and the Peace Treaty , it is in itself 
no threat to the peace of Europe . The offer Hitler 
made of twenty-five-year peace pacts with his neigh­
b�urs1�s one that should receive very thoro�gh examina­tion . 
The Daily Hera ld , the Labour Party newspaper , urged that the op-
portunity presented by . Hitler ' s  offers should be accepted and 
s tated : 
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Either we negotiate a new settlement . • • or we 
deliberately begin � new war in order to prevent 
German troops �rom garrisoning German towns _  • • •  
War is out of the question . And that being so, 
wisdom requires that when th.e League Council  meets 
it shall devote itself ,  not to recrimination and 
useless snarling , but to the constructive task of 
making , with this as the opportunity , a new, more 
equitable, and therefore , more lasting settlement . 15  
The News Chronic le , tol lowing the trend of the other newspapers , 
insisted , too, that 11Herr Hitler ' s  ·invitation must be taken up 
without delay . 11 1() In the Daily Sket�h ,  Herbert Sidebottom, a 
politica.l commentator who also wrote for the Sunday Times and 
Daily Telegraph , wrote under the nom de plume, "Candidus"  that 
"Her·r Hitler should be taken at his word . 11 1 7  The diplomatic 
correspondent of the same newspaper stated : 
• • • the real istic view is that advantage should 
be taken of this German offer . It is suggested 
tha.t it is best to blink at a lreach which may pave 
the way to more cordial international relations . 1 8  
The· gener�l response from the British press was ,  then, to try 
to construct a better , more lasting, peace out of the ruins of 
Locarno and Versailles . The Rhineland was ,  after a l l ,  part of 
German territory, and was ,  as one newspaper put it , to Germany 
wh�t Sussex was to England-!9that is to say an integral par t .  
Whilst there was a general sympathy for the French position, 
there was also a general sympathy for that of Germany , even 
if there was not an absolute trust of Germany in all  case s .  
At 1 1  a .m . , March 9 ,  the Cabinet met in London .  The 
first subject discussed was the statement to be read by Eden 
that afternoon in the House of Commons . The statement briefly 
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outli_ned the events of the previous few days and th.en com-
mented on the Government ' s  position . Eden made it c lear 
that no independent action could be ·considered and that 
the League of Na_tions was the proper place for :eurther dis-
cuss.ion . He condemned Germany ' s· repudiation of Locarno but 
went on to add that "there 'is .  .. .. no reason to suppose that 
. . . h f h · 1 · . 2 0  the present German action implies a t reat o osti ities . "  
Finally , Eden echoed The T�mes in urging the importance of 
rebuildi�g a framework for peace in Europe. The general 
feeli.ng in the House o� Commons after that statement was 
. · 2 1  largely sympathetic towards· Germany . 
The next day , The Times urged that Britain must seize 
h . d b . 2 2  t e opportunity presente y Germany ' s  actio n .  Candidus , 
in_ the Daily· Sketch , said : " I  see in Herr Hitler ' s  proposals 
a chance that the spectre of war can be banished from Central 
Europe for at  least twenty-five years . 11 2 3  On the same day , 
the News Chronicle carried a survey taken the day before . 
Although not really statistical ly sound because the sampling 
was so small--only s ixteen people--it did include a fair cross-
section of society and is at least indicative of the views 
held by the general public . Only one person in the survey 
wanted strong action against Germany and of the rest ,  whilst 
four shqwed a slight distrust of Hitler , everyone thought 
that the move should not lead to war and eight were totally in 
agreement with Hitler ' s_ action . 24 The oa·ily Mirror ' s  editorial 
for that day cal led for Britain to bring France and Germany to-
gether and "strive for th.e reconciliation of the two great 
t . h d .  1 t 1 . . · 1 · . 2 5  na ions w ose unen ing quarre may a ast ruin civL ization . "  
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At th.e next Cabinet meeting , which was held on 
March. 11 ,  the emphasi.s was on a peaceful solution. There 
was a report on a meeting of the Locarno powers that had been 
h.eld on the night before , in Paris , in which the British repre-
sentatives had strongly urged the nedessity of a peaceful 
solution. It was also pointed out that British 'public opinion 
was largely sympathetic to Germany � Much time was given to 
the consideration of how to re�train the French and how to 
find a solution that was a.cceptable to both th.e French and 
th.e Gerll\ans·. To this end, Eden was to see th.e German Ambas-
s�ador that evening in the hope of getting some assurance of 
Germany ' s  good intentions and to emphasize the need to obtain 
a peaceful settlement . 26 
The two voi.ces that came out decidedly against Germany 
were those of Austen Chamberlain and Winston Churchill . In 
a series of speeches in March, Churchill decried Britain ' s  
lack of preparedness as opposed to Germany ' s ,  and , in his 
history of the Second World War, placed much of the blame 
f G . . . . h . . 27 or ermany ' s  resurgent position upon Britis inaction. 
Sir Austen Chamberlain made a speech in Cambridge in which 
he expressed the view that German assurances of peace, in 
the form of the seven-point peace plan, were not to be trusted. 28 
These ,  however , are the only two prominent voices that came 
out against Germany . 
On March 10 , the German Ambassador to London sent a 
communication to Berlin in which he outlined British. reaction 
to the Germa.n moves .  Whilst he noted the generally sympathetic 
attitude in Britain , he also added a warning note : 
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The overall picture . • recalls • • •  in certain 
re�pects the situation as it was in July, ;914 .  Then, 
too, public opinion was at first much inclined to the 
Central Powers .  • . . When the storm clouds gathered 
menacingly , however , the picture quickly changed, and 
then transformed itself with astonishing speed into 
its exact opposite. • . • a sympathetic attitude 
on the part of public opinion is no absolutely re­
liable insurance . But it does constitute a valuable 
ba_sis upon which a Government , determined to be moderate 
and reasonable , could pursue and implement a policy of 
reconciliation, unhampered by internal difficulties . 29 
Not only was the Government wholly in favour of being "moderate 
and reasonable , "  but the King was exerting pressure on his 
ministers to do s o .  A German j ournalist in London , Paul 
Scheffer, c<;mununicated the fol lowing to the German Foreign 
Mi.ni,stry : 
The King is taking an extraordinarily active part 
in the whole af�air ; he has caused a number of 
important people in the Government to come and see 
him .  • • . The King won ' t  hear of there being a 
danger of war .  He is absolutely convinced that what 
must now be done is to get over the ' breach of law • 
as quickly as possible and get on to the practical 
discussion of the Fuhrer and Chancellor ' s  proposals . 
In view· of the tremendous influence possessed by 
the King and his immense energy, due importance must 
be attached to this where Germany is concerned . 30  
Talks continued throughout March , in order to try to 
reach some kind of compromise acceptable to France and Belgium, 
as well as Germany � There was ,  however , no agreement reached 
and a stalemate ensued. The stalemate was broken, after a 
fashion, when the Council of the League of Nations met in 
London, on March 24 ,  and a resolution adopted . The resolution 
contained three broad and nebulous proposa l s :  first , action 
on the part of the Council was to be held in abeyance in 
view of tne ta lks going on ; secondly ,  the Governments of the 
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Locarno powers were invited .to keep the Co.uncil informed 
of any progress that was m�de; and thirdly , the Council 
was to meet again to consider the question further as cir­
cumstances made it desirable .. 3 1  This res'olution effectively 
killed a general discussion of the German reoccupation of the 
Rhineland and the seven-point peace plan , although the British 
Government , which was largely responsible for pushing the re-
solution through the League Council , did continue to try to 
find an equitable solution to the problem.. Meanwhile,  the 
crisis in Abyssinia still was a cause for concern in Europe 
and dominated the next meetings of the League Council . 
When the British Government tried to reopen the ques-
tion in May by sending Germany a questionnaire in order to 
clarify certain points , it was met with no response,  and 
despite repeated attempts to elicit some reply from Hitler , 
he delayed answering. Thus , when final attempts were made 
to reopen negotiations , in September, little progress was 
made;  the problem was dropped , and the status quo accepted . 
Throughout the crisis , the British attitude was one 
of conciliation and accommodation . It was also , probably , 
the culmination of British attempts to willingly appease 
Germany . After this time , the word appeasement se�ms to take 
on a different meaning and Britain ' s  attitude is not always 
so willingly conciliatory. 
VI 
It has al�eady been stated th�t ,. �ue to its geo­
political positiont there is a continuity to British foreign 
policy . Being an off-shore island with a l imited amount 
of natural resources , Britain has always been dependent upon 
international trade and it was this dependence which led 
Britain to favour the status quo or at least non-revolutionary 
change as being the most conducive international atmosphere 
in which. to fulfill its corruni tments . It  has also been counter 
to British. interests to allow an hegemony to establish itself 
on the continent s ince it would not only be a threat to in­
ternal independence , but also one to external interests . 
Thus , fanother British interest has been the balance of power , 
whereby no single nation or configuration of nations was 
allowed to achieve a position of strength which would threaten 
the interests and independence of other nations . 
After the First World War , it was in British interests 
to restore the international status quo and peaceful trade 
arno!lgst the nations . Europe in 1919 , however ,  was a very 
di�ferent place from Europe in 1914 . First, because the balance 
of power , and the all iance system which it engendered , was 
discredited by the war , the system of collective security which 
President Wilson proposed was readily accepted . The success 
or failure of the Lea9ue of Nations is not the concern of this 
analysis,  but the existence of the League did alter the 
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international s ituation somewhat .  Secondly, Russia  had 
become the :(irst Coinn1unis:t nation and its very existence 
altered the international s·cene . Despite. these changes , Bri-
tain ' s  foreign policy itself changed l ittle and can be summed 
up in general terms • 
• • • Britain ' s  general interest was peace;  that 
she had no territorial ambitions on the continent 
of Europe ; • . •  she would fight ,  nevertheles s ,  to 
prevent any power from establishing hegemony over 
the rest of Europe; . . • she would also fight to 
defend her dominions , colonies , dependencies , and 
conununications of the British Empire ; • • •  that she 
would not fight any power merely because she disl iked 
its domestic policy and methods of internal govern­
ment. l 
In addition to the desire for peac e ,  there was a strong desire 
to return to economic sta.bili ty and prosperity . It was re-
cognized that to ensure this , Communist Russia had to be 
accommodated and that Germany must be returned to the comity 
of nations . In several speeches in the Houses of Parliament, 
the idea was expressed that the recovery of Europe was de-
pendent upon the recovery and participation of Russia and 
2 Germany . The two fundamental ideas in British foreign policy 
during the inter-war years , then, were peace and international 
s tabi lity . 
It was within the general framework of peace and 
economic stabil ity that · Br�tain shaped its attitude toward 
Germany . The basic feel ing was that the Treaty of Versailles 
was unfair and wrong-headed . Although , in 19 3 3 ,  it was claimed 
in an editorial in The Times (quoted supra) that the peace 
treaties were essentially fair and that those people who felt 
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otherwise were a small minority, by 1934  .that newspaper had 
reversed itself and was maintaining that certain portions 
of the treaties were unfair and should be revised. Intrinsic 
to tfie idea that Germany should be returned to its full status 
as a nation state was the idea that certain provisions of the 
Trea·ty of Versailles should be changed or completely abolished . 
Britain was , throughout the 1920 � s  and early 1930 ' s ,  
l 
on the whole sympathetic to German claims of revision of the 
Treaty of Versail les . During the 192 0 ' s ,  this concerned the 
revision of reparations schedules and the problem of disarma-
ment. There were, however, problems more fundamental to 
Gepnany ' s  status as a nation state . The fact Germany did not 
have full sovereignty over all its territory or the means to 
defend its land was always a problem, but it did not come 
to the fore until the mid-19 3 0 ' s .  These were problems that 
were not as easy for the old allies to face , especially s ince 
France and Belgium felt threatened by a renascent Germany . 
With the acceptance of equality of armaments , in 1 9 3 2 ,  part 
of the problem was solved--at least until Germany made that 
concept a fact .  The question of full sovereignty over all  
German lands was solved with the reoccupation of  the Rhineland 
in 1936 . In both cases,  Britain reacted more or less favourably . 
The advent of Hitler ' s  Nazi  regime in 1933  changed the 
scenario in Central Europe. The strong criticism of Germany 
in the British press early in 1933  was largely due to the domes-
tic policies of the regime . Whilst it is fair to say that many 
people in Britain found the persecutions of the Jews and liberals 
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and the censorship of the press abhorrent,  the British 
Government rec·�gnized that this was an internal problem in 
which it could not get involved. In add ition , at the same 
time that there was a gene�al outcry in Britain against the 
domestic s ituation in Germany, the Briti§h_ Government was 
negotiating a trade agreement with. the Nazi Government . By 
the end of 1 9 3 3 , also, the government in Germany had s topped 
the more violent persecutions and the problem defused itself .  
The r ise of  a violently national istic Germany , however , 
did cause some concern in Britain . Winston Churchil l and 
Austen Chamberlain led the op�osition to the appeasement of 
Germany , and by 1 9 3 5  it was recognized that Germany was a po­
tential threat to European peace .  The increase in defence 
spending in that year was an effort to prepare Britain for 
the eventuality that other mea.ns to accommodate German demands 
failed . There is , then , a certain ambiguity in the British 
attitude toward Germany . On the one hand , it was recognized 
that Germany could pose a threat to peace; on the other hand , 
means were sought to conciliate Germany . It was felt that 
it was better to include Germany in the international cottununity 
and thus exercise a l imited control over it , than to have it 
outside the community and thu s ,  subject to no contro l .  The 
Naval Agreement of 1 9 3 5  and the proposed Air Pact and 
Eastern Locarno were an attempt to draw Germany into a system 
of agreements that would avert war �  The hope after the re­
occupation of the Rhineland was that the system of agreements 
would be extended to a system of bilateral agreements between 
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Germany and its. ne�ghhours ·guaranteeing frontiers , thereby 
further ensuring peace . 
The sympathy of the Bri.tish ·Governmen·t with German 
demands found a dif fer·ent expres·s.ion outside Government 
circles . That sympa.thy lay more in the acceptance of some 
"system of rights " possessed by a nation· state than an attempt 
to control Germany. This attitude ·is probably best exempli-
f ied by a comment made to Eden by a taxidriver on the re-
occupation of the Rhtneland : " I  suppose Jerry fthe Germa� 
L: ___. 
can do what they like in his own ba.ck garden, can ' t  he? 11 3 
This �ttitude is typic�l ,  then, of the wider reaction to 
German fore�gn policy , which appears in a more sophisticated 
form in the press and Parliam_en·t .  
D .  C .  Wal l ,  in his book· Per?onal·ities ·and ·policies 4 
states that British foreign policy toward Germany was formu-
lated before the Nazis and the character of the Nazi regime 
were established . This ass·e.:rtion (echoed by Gatzke in his 
book5) is clearly true since the British attitude in the 1930 ' s  
was largely a continuation of that of the 1920 ' s .  By 19 3 5 ,  
however , when the character of the Nazi regime was c lear, there 
were still further attempts to accommodate the Nazi  Government 
whilst preparing for other eventualities . 
Other than the aberrant influence of German domestic 
policy , the British ·were sympathetic toward Germany and con-
tinued to be so �s long as the fundamental aims of peace and 
ec·onomic stability could be served by it.. When there was a 
threat of a German hegemony in Europe� that sympathy changed 
drastically .  
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